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2. Abstract 
This paper explores the possibilities of the political-economy theory, 
distributism, both as a form of analysis and as a practical source of cooperative 
economy ideas.  Regarding analysis, in this paper distributist thought will be 
used to analyse the currently hegemonic political-economy theory, globalised 
neoliberalism, and offer that the historical critique of liberal derived economic 
theories which reference their internal priority disorders is still pertinent and 
valid.  The paper will then explicate the underpinning anthropocentric concepts 
of distributism – the person, the common good, the good life, subsidiarity, and 
familial and community sources of authority – and how these can help manifest 
technologically dynamic, participatory, egalitarian, stable, sustainable, localised 
political-economies.  To demonstrate this, the integrated and coordinated 
cooperative economies of Mondragon Corporacion Cooperativa (MCC) and The 
Cleveland Model (TCM) will be analysed and contextualised, and the critiques of 
both models discussed.  Furthermore, the debates regarding distributism and 
cooperative economies more generally will be explicated, so too the apparent 
strengths and failings of the Australian cooperative political-economy terrain.  
Finally, it will be suggested that due to its already distributist nature, the 
Catholic Archdiocese of Sydney appears to be a pertinent research direction for 
deeper explorations into the applicability of distributist economies in New 
South Wales.     
 Page 8 of 112 
 
3. Thesis Summary and Introduction 
N.B. The below introduction uses a similar format to Ridley-Duff (2010) 
Thesis Proposals 
This preliminary research will propose that the distributist-type economies of 
Mondragon Corporacion Cooperativa (MCC) and The Cleveland Model (TCM) are 
sustainable, anthropocentric models that could be applied to a New South 
Wales (NSW) context.  Both MCC and TCM comprise mostly of semi-
autonomous, sub-cooperatives that are integrated and coordinated through 
overarching cooperative bodies.  Regarding TCM, this integration also includes 
likeminded anchor institutions, from which local cooperatives leverage off job 
contracts (Alperovitz 2013).  This thesis will further propose that the Sydney 
Catholic organisation and network terrain, the Catholic Archdiocese of Sydney, 
appears as a strong candidate for future research into the NSW viability for 
either TCM or MCC.  This assessment stemmed from the already distributist 
nature of the Archdiocese’s network, as well as from the network’s ostensibly 
compatible anchor institutions.      
Moreover, this research involved an explication of the political-economy theory 
distributism, which directly influenced the formation of MCC, and by extension 
TCM.  This paper will offer that distributism’s clear anthropocentric principles 
have the potential to manifest person centred, family vesting, egalitarian, 
locality specific economies of great dynamism (Mathews 2003, 2007, 2008 [A]).  
Regarding its origins, distributism is an outcome of 19th Century Catholic social 
justice thought, and theorists such as Mathews (2003, 2007, 2008 [B]) have 
called for its reincorporation into political-economy discussions.  Indeed, this 
paper is partly a response to that call.  
Furthermore, part of this paper’s purpose was to analyse the current 
hegemonic political-economy theory, globalised neoliberalism, (Ralston-Saul 
2005) using distributist epistemology.  Distributist epistemology places 
emphasis upon explicating underlying theoretical assumptions; or said 
differently, highlighting a theory’s first-order priorities (Chesterton 1910; 
1927).  And through highlighting liberalism’s theoretical priorities 
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(neoliberalism’s source and basis) (Chang 2014), the paper hopes to 
demonstrate that historical critiques of liberalism, which argues that its first-
order priorities are disordered (Devas 1892), are still valid and pertinent.  This 
paper will also offer that this disordering inevitably manifests broad 
sustainability issues, and perhaps relates to neoliberalism’s current vociferous 
global opposition (Bremmer 2017; Klein 2014; Mead 2017).  Moreover, this 
paper proposes that distributist theory speaks to neoliberalism’s priority 
disorders, and may provide workable and sustainable alternatives at least at 
the local level. 
Nevertheless, I offer that distributist-type political-economies appear to require 
determined coordination from powerful change agents, such as authoritative, 
civic-minded institutions.  Such political-economies also appear to emerge 
within locales forsaken by substantial capital flows, but in which there are still 
civic-minded institutions.  And without coordinating organisations and 
institutions, I would propose that distributive-type economies do not emerge 
organically or spontaneously, and that the historically disparate NSW 
cooperative terrain appears to confirm this.  From this apparent need for 
coordination, I chose to explore relevant coordinated organisation terrains 
within NSW from which a MCC or TCM could emerge. A result of this, was that 
the Catholic Archdiocese of Sydney was identified as an appropriate focus for 
future research into the viability, or not, of distributist political-economies in 
NSW.   
Methodology and Approach 
The research sits within the academic field of political-economy, and uses 
theoretical first-order assumptions (Devas 1892; Wolin 2004) as a basis for 
enquiry into differing theories.  Moreover, the researcher chose a qualitative 
literature review method to help illuminate such assumptions.  This method 
could also afford a solid base for future research, by providing demonstrable 
theoretical links between the research and prospective participants.  
The epistemological approach I chose was distributist.  This approach was 
chosen for two main reasons: firstly, when considering cooperative political 
economy theories, I would argue that distributism, and the Catholic political-
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economy tradition generally, had the most developed epistemology; and 
secondly, it was both the theory and tradition which most influenced the 
creation of MCC (Geoghegan 2017; Mathews 2008 [A];).  Moreover, MCC 
directly influenced the creation of TCM (Schwartz 2009), and thus, this paper 
places TCM within the distributist orbit.  A salient point is that TCM theorists 
such as Alperovitz (2013), and cooperative theorists such as Bowman & Stone 
(2004), do not appear to reference distributism directly, and instead focus upon 
MCC’s organisational successes.  Whether this absence is due to distributism’s 
Catholic heritage, or an unawareness of the theory, is not within this paper’s 
remit to decide.  Nevertheless, this paper will concur with Mathews (2003, 
2007, 2008 [A]) in viewing distributism as a rich epistemological source of 
cooperative ideas from which analyses and potentialities can be drawn.  
Regarding distributism, the theory argues that an egalitarian, sustainable, 
wealth producing, and technologically sophisticated political-economy could 
emerge via the use of first order principles (Belloc 1946; Chesterton 1927).  I 
have surmised these principles as being: the person, the common good, the good 
life, subsidiarity, and socio-familial sources of authority. These first-order 
principles require manifestations through second-order principles (or methods 
and mechanisms) which focus upon creating dispersed, broad scale capital 
ownership and control within voluntary and democratically coordinated, 
cooperative networks (Mathews 2003, 2008 [A]).  Perhaps the most obvious 
example of these are localised cooperatives integrated within broader 
cooperative networks of finance, trade, supply, retail, logistics, and political 
support (Mathews 2003, 2008 [A]).  TCM extends this network concept to 
cooperative integration with local businesses, civil society organisations, 
government bodies, and anchor institutions (Alperovitz 2013; Howard 2012).  
Such combinations are thought to enable dignified work, family, and 
community relations (Alperovitz 2013; Howard 2012; Matthews 2003, 2008 
[A]).  
In fact, dignified relations are central to distributist thought, as well as the 
necessity for stable and secure environments for both families and local 
communities (Chesterton 1927; Mathews 2003).  This is arguably in 
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contradistinction to neoliberal theory, which ostensibly grants centrality to the 
requirements of the market, and to the state institutions and private 
corporations which enable it (Robbins 2011).  Rather than the market or the 
state, distributism views the person and the family as society’s premier and 
authoritative institutions.  And for a political-economy to better reflect these 
sources of authority, distributists suggest that persons should mostly own, hire, 
and control capital in empowering, localised, and meaningful ways, rather than 
the reverse which is arguably the norm under liberal derived economic 
systems.  This too relates to the distributist emphasis upon personal dignity, 
since distributism views the ability to say no to market based coercions as an 
important part of personal dignity.  And such an ability is thought to be largely 
dependent upon secure, meaningful capital ownership and strong familial and 
community relations.  Similarly, distributists argue that persons should never 
be viewed as production costs and inputs, as this is conflicting with personal 
dignity; rather, persons should be viewed as collaborators and potential 
teachers (Belloc 1946; Chesterton 1927).   
Regarding distributist analysis, I would argue that it trains the analyst to ask 
questions such as: “what is the anthropocentric point of the process or 
theory?”; “what is the scenario to which the theorist wants society to 
“progress”?”; and “what is the ideal or preferred scenario from which the 
theorist’s critique or prescriptions are implicitly drawn from?” (Chesterton 
1908; 1927).  Such questions invariably return to explorations of first-order 
priorities and assumptions, and from these emerge, arguably, the bases of all 
political-economy theories (Devas 1892; Wolin 2004).  Of note, is that both 
liberal and technocratic theorists have historically argued that their respective 
systems-based outlooks render first-order priorities superfluous, since a 
political-economy’s primary role is to maximise production of commodities 
(Devas 1892; Wolin 2004).  Not surprisingly, distributists such as Belloc 
(1946), and political-economists such as Alperovitz (2013), hold such 
arguments are specious, and counter-argue that liberal-technocratic systems 
both reward and asymmetrically empower capital owning and controlling elites 
at the expense of working persons’ security and dignity.  Furthermore, a 
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distributist analysis would require a question at the end of every prescription 
for maximum production of commodities: “for what anthropocentric purpose?” 
(Chesterton 1927).  The answer to which would inevitability lead back to first-
order priorities.          
Findings 
This paper will put forward three sets of research findings.  The first set 
propose that a lack of coordinated cooperation amongst cooperative 
organisations has been (ironically) the main failing of the broader cooperative 
movement both within Australia and abroad.  And this dynamic helps explain 
why individual cooperatives, whilst often being able to match and better their 
capitalist and technocratic rivals, have not been able to coalesce into broader, 
distributist-type movements.  Nevertheless, where cooperatives have 
cooperated and integrated (such as with MCC and TCM), there have emerged 
noteworthy successes (Dubb & Howard 2012; Mathews 2003).  This argument 
is not new (Mathews 2003, 2008 [A]).  However, I would propose that such 
levels of coordinated cooperation appear to emerge best within localities 
wherein capital flows have avoided, but in which there is still a strong 
institutional presence.  For instance, MCC emerged (1956) in what was an 
impoverished region of Spain, but one which still had the institutional presence 
of the Catholic Church, and it was this presence which initiated and helped 
facilitate the MCC enterprise (Mathews 2003, 2008 [A]).  Regarding TCM, it 
emerged in the economically depressed American “Rust Belt” city of Cleveland; 
a city which had nevertheless managed to keep its noteworthy range of anchor 
institutions off which cooperative work contracts could be leveraged 
(Alperovitz 2013; Howard 2012).  An extension of this finding, I would suggest, 
is that regional, integrated cooperative political-economies do not appear to 
emerge spontaneously or organically.  Rather, these networks seem to require 
help from capable and sympathetic organisations and institutions to initiate, 
coordinate, and develop them.  Furthermore, without these cooperatively 
minded overarching bodies and networks, it appears that individual 
cooperative type organisations are more vulnerable to capitalist predation, 
unofficial business boycotts, and market manipulations (Balnave & Patmore 
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2012; Bowman & Stone 2004).  That said, once such networks have been 
established they have proven themselves robust (Alperovitz 2013; Mathews 
2003) 
This apparent requirement by cooperative networks for established and 
sympathetic institutional supports, led me to explore possible sources of such 
support within NSW.  A result of this was the research’s second set of findings, 
which offers that the institutional and network terrain of the Catholic 
Archdiocese of Sydney appeared a strong candidate for a possible activation of 
a MCC or TCM.  TCM seemed especially plausible due to the presence of 
seemingly compatible institutions within the network.  However, the overall 
reasons for this assessment included the terrain’s philosophical compatibilities 
with distributism, its already extensive manifestations of distributist-type 
organisations and networks, its integrated nature, and its potential to manifest 
an overarching cooperative body or bodies.  The research also looked at the 
secular overarching cooperative organisations within NSW, and surmised that 
their capacities and missions did not appear favourable to playing such 
coordination roles.  From this, the report surmised that the Sydney Catholic 
organisational and network terrain appeared promising for future research 
into MCC or TCM applications. 
The third and final set of findings proposes that the success of MCC and TCM 
have, in effect, meant that the historical critiques of both cooperatives and 
cooperative economic models are neither as damning or as pertinent as they 
once were.  For instance, historical liberal critiques arguing that cooperative 
economies lack capitalist dynamism and require excessive worker conformity 
(Devas 1892) are, in effect, rebutted by both MCC’s and TCM’s cutting-edge 
dynamisms and worker diversities (Dubb & Howard 2012; Mathews 2012; 
Trattner 2017).  Similarly, liberal arguments insisting that cooperatives are not 
normative because they are not what ordinary persons want (Epstein, Block & 
Woods Jnr 2007), are most likely contradicted by the negligible worker-owner 
turnover and the revivifying, empowering worker-owner experiences noted at 
both MCC and TCM (Forcadell 2005; Howard 2012).  And whilst cooperatives, 
such as those at MCC, have not proven immune to technocratic processes 
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(Kasmir 1999), there also appears evidence that such trends are reversible and 
not inevitable (Forcadell 2005; Ridley-Duff 2010).  And finally, the successes of 
both TCM and MCC perhaps render the perception that cooperative economies 
are no longer relevant, as perhaps no longer valid (Alperovitz 2013; Mathews 
2007).      
Thesis Originality and Value 
Key contributions of this exploratory thesis include the sets of criteria related 
to the emergence of distributist-type political-economies, and the supposition 
that within NSW the Sydney Catholic organisational and network terrain 
appeared capable of manifesting a MCC or TCM, or at least further research into 
the matter.  The report also re-examined what are arguably neglected political-
economy fields of research; namely, the efficacy of distributist political-
economies, and the efficacy for distributist epistemology both as a form of 
analysis and as a source of anthropocentric, sustainable possibilities.  Finally, 
this exploratory thesis hopes to modestly contribute to the venerable field of 
political-economy, with special regards to distributism and cooperatives.  
With regards to the last point, the below section will discuss the discipline of 
political-economy to better illuminate and locate this preliminary research 
project. 
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4. Political-Economy: The economy is more than the 
market 
Political Economy as a discursive field 
In this paper, political economy will signify a form of enquiry which uses 
demonstrable political theories to show their impacts, or potential impacts, 
upon socio-economic phenomena (Chang 2014, pp. 451 – 460; Wolin 2004, pp. 3 
– 4).  A salient point is that whilst the relationship between an economy and its 
political theory are intertwined (Abercrombie, Hill & Turner 2006, pp. 293 – 
294; Chang 2014, chap. 4), the two can be separated, and it will be argued that 
an economy mostly follows its operative political theory (Chang 2014, chap. 4; 
MacKinnon & Cumbers 2007 p. 14; Wolin 2004, chap. 1).  This point is relevant 
since it contradicts the current hegemonic economic theory and its antecedents, 
neoliberalism and liberalism respectively, which mostly view the economy as a 
singular force which politics should habitually conform to (Chang 2014, pp. 115 
– 127; M & R Friedman 1990)  
Political-Economy analysis 
Most political economists hold that former theories can still powerfully analyse 
current situations, thus, making them no less relevant.  Similarly, former 
theories can also insightfully critique au courant theories (Chang 2014, chap. 4; 
Wolin 2004, p. xxii).  This is significant to this paper, as distributism is 
considered somewhat of a “former theory”; or at least not a current one 
(Mathews 2003, 2007).  Nevertheless, this paper will differ from most political-
economy definitions (such as Abercrombie et al [2006] and Chang [2014]), in 
that it will trace the origins of political economy discourse back to Plato rather 
than to Adam Smith (the more usual starting point).  This too is significant since 
this paper will reference concepts which pre-date Adam Smith (1723 -1790) 
with regards to distributism, whose precepts claim Medieval heritage (Belloc 
1946; Epstein et al 2007).    
Political-Economy terms 
In this paper, the term political will mean what is public, since politics deals 
with matters, functions, ideas, and theories common to all, and that political 
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decisions affect all persons directly or indirectly.  Practical political matters 
may include law and order, legalities, social contracts, defence, publicly 
provided goods and services, and government regulations; whilst political 
theories may cover concepts regarding the roles of persons, families, 
communities, nation-states, businesses, and governments.  Similarly, political 
authority claims to speak for society in its common quality, and political 
membership signifies membership to life’s common involvements.  With 
regards to the term politics, this will be defined as an activity centred on the 
‘quest for competitive advantage between groups, individuals, or societies’ 
within situations of relative scarcity.  This in turn produces public scale 
consequences (Wolin 2004, pp. 3, 4, 11). 
In contrast, economic matters pertain more to the countless mostly private 
transactions centred upon the exchange of goods and services.  These 
exchanges help the polity to exist.  However, for these exchanges to be stable, 
effective, or even possible, private transactions require political rules and 
publicly provided goods and services.  Similarly, political rules require political 
institutions (for example, law courts and parliament) for enforcement.  When 
these institutions and rules are combined to form settled, deterministic 
practices they then form the political terrain from which an economy can 
operate (Edwards 2002, pp. 10 – 18; Wolin 2004, pp. 3-4).   
In this paper, the term economy will mean the free actions of persons bound 
together for their individual and collective subsistence and continuance (Devas 
1892).  An economy can include money and financial products (symbols which 
allow persons to make claims on society’s resources), employment, economic 
transfers (ranging from parental care, help from friends, charity, public 
education, progressive taxation, and the welfare state), and the production and 
consumption of goods and services (Chang 2014, pp. 21 – 26).  Thus, in this 
paper, the economy will signify a social construct bigger than just “the market” 
(Chang 2014, pp. 455 – 456). 
The combination of the political terrain and the economy forms the political-
economy, from which necessities, wealth, power, and authority can be 
generated.  And a settled political economy can play a significant role in the 
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order, direction, and outcome of human behaviour (Edwards 2002 pp. 10 – 18; 
Wolin 2004, pp. 3 – 4, 7).  This point is salient to the thesis, since distributists 
argue that anthropocentric needs should order and direct otherwise coercive 
market processes (Chesterton 1927), whilst liberal theorists view capital and 
market “freedoms” as being concomitant with, and reflections of, consumer 
desires and even political freedoms (M & R Friedman 1990, Chap. 1).  
Cui bono?  
One of the most significant questions a political-economist can ask is “Cui 
bono?”  (“for whose benefit?”).  From this it can be argued that no set of 
economic data or policy prescriptions are value or power neutral (Chang 2014, 
pp. 451 – 452).  The question also illuminates a political-economist’s own 
predispositions, in that it shows his or her perceptions on what are societal 
benefits (or what is “good”?), who should receive them and how (or what is 
“the good society”?), and what are the cumulative effects of these processes (or 
what is “the good life”?).  And it is this paper’s contention that such first-order 
priorities determine (consciously or otherwise) the thought architecture of 
political-economy theories (Chesterton 1910; Wolin 2004).  Following this 
argument, this paper will analyse below what I have determined to be liberal 
economics’ first-order premises.  This analysis is necessary since liberal 
economics (re: globalised-neoliberalism) is hegemonic (Edwards 2002; Klein 
2014; Piketty 2016), and as such, it requires consideration vis-à-vis this paper’s 
later exploration of distributist alternatives. 
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5. Globalised-neoliberalism 
This thesis’ exploration of distributism is set against the hegemonic political-
economy theory of globalised-neoliberalism (Edwards 2002; Ralston-Saul 
2005).  Presently, this ideology is experiencing vociferous resistance which 
appears both global yet disparate, with manifestations ranging from the 
election of President Trump, to Brexit, to the rise of “populist” (left and right) 
parties across Europe (Bremmer 2017; Brooks 2016; Goodhart 2017; Mead 
2017).  Partly in response, the report will later explore a set of alternatives, 
namely, distributist-type political-economies such as MCC and TCM, and argue 
for their validity.  However, the report will firstly set forth an analysis of 
globalised-neoliberalism, using distributist epistemology (see introduction) to 
better determine neoliberalism’s historical and theoretical structures.    
This paper will argue that globalised neoliberalism continues to operate, 
consciously or otherwise, off classical liberalism’s theoretical assumptions 
(first-order principles) regarding the person, the society, the economy, the 
environment, and societal progress.  According to Edwards (2002), these 
assumptions are rarely argued for publicly, since they differ decisively from the 
broader public’s views.  More salient to this report, however, is that liberal 
economic assumptions often and arguably manifest contradictory political-
economy phenomena.  Perhaps the primary contradiction is that competitive, 
individuated, subjectivist, liberty seeking consumers appear to require 
standardised, authoritarian, technocratic, and corporatist controlled resource 
allocation systems to satiate (and even generate) consumer desires (Robbins 
2011, chap. 1 & pp. 80 – 88; Wolin 2004, chap. 10).  Historical critiques of 
Liberal economics view such contradictions as unsurprising.  These long-
standing critiques argue that the foremost liberty of liberal economics is not the 
liberty of persons per se, but the liberty of competitive and masterful capital 
controlling elites to construct circumstances best suited for the generation and 
exercise of socio-economic power.  And that technocratic resource allocation 
systems provide such circumstances (Healy 1967, Robbins 2011, chaps. 2, 3; 
Uzawa 2005, pp. 1 – 3).  However, liberal theorists such as Epstein et al (2007) 
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and M & R Friedman (1990) dismiss such assertions, claiming instead that the 
success and normativity of liberal economics stems from the willing 
participation of consumer-minded citizens.  Moreover, liberalism’s supporters 
point to political Liberalism’s historical extension of individual rights, societal 
liberalism’s consistent ability to peacefully absorb unfamiliar persons and 
cultures, and economic liberalism’s (capitalism’s) consistent ability to produce 
profuse goods and services (Ahmari 2016, pp. 41 - 47; M & R Friedman 1990).  
Considering these arguments, this thesis will offer that liberal economics 
asymmetrically rewards significant owners and controllers of capital, whilst 
sidelining the anthropocentric requirements of most working persons (Robbins 
2011, chap. 2).  Moreover, it will be argued that this is achieved via a hegemonic 
consensus that is built upon contentious assumptions. 
The Global Neoliberal Consensus 
This paper offers that the unofficial global neoliberal manifesto was, in effect, 
stated at the Davos World Economic Forum of 2017, and appears to follow 
three broad precepts: maximum border openness for capital flows and markets; 
maximum rights and opportunities for global labour movement; and maximum 
development, integration, and uptake of new capitalist technologies (Bailey 
2017).  The prescriptions are concise, and their Davos adherents remain 
determined to implement them despite vociferous global opposition (Bailey 
2017).  The Davos formula also rests upon neoliberal prescriptions 
progressively adopted by governments globally since the 1980’s.  These 
prescriptions stress that governments should: “float” the dollar; keep market 
interference and regulations to a minimum; sell public assets and services to 
private interests (privatisation); enforce controls on labour organising; lower 
corporate tax rates; provide infrastructure necessary for commerce; determinedly 
enforce copyrights, property rights and commercial contracts; slash tariffs; 
weaken labour solidarity and power through increased business access to global 
labour; and reduce the provision of social services (Edwards 2002, p. 9; Ralston-
Saul 2005, pp. 15 – 25; Robbins 2011, chap. 3; Smith 2017, pp. 34 - 38).  
Neoliberals have argued that these standardised prescriptions (whatever the 
social, political, economic, and locality circumstances) should be applied to spur 
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competition, increase consumer choice, generate vast economies of scale, and 
create economic growth (Bailey 2017; Edwards 2002, p. 9; Ralston-Saul 2005, 
pp. 15 – 25; Robbins 2011, chap. 3; Steger 2013).  However, the true desiderata 
for neoliberal prescriptions, as argued at Davos, is their ability to generate 
unprecedented production and distribution efficiencies.  These efficiencies are 
thought to produce technological amazements, unprecedented abundance of 
goods and services, and material satisfactions for the worlds’ citizens (Bailey 
2017; Edwards 2002, chap. 5).  However, for these efficiencies to be realised, 
the global neoliberal project needs to be controlled and guided by technocratic 
experts, with government market interventions kept to a minimum (Bailey 
2017; Edwards 2002, pp. 77 - 78).  Nonetheless, the simplicity of neoliberal 
economic prescriptions veil contested historical and theoretical assumptions 
(Chang 2014, Robbins 2011; Wolin 2004).  
Liberalism’s First-Order Principles 
Historical critiques of Liberal economic theory dating to the early 1800’s 
(Devas 1892, pp. 537 – 548; 552 – 558; New Catholic Encyclopedia JUD - LYT 
1967, pp. 701 – 707; Wolin 2004, chap. 9) argued that liberal economic theory 
confused first and second order theoretical principles.  First-order principles 
cover moral premises, ideals, and interpretations of persons and societies from 
which actions and policies derive.  Moreover, first order principles are neither 
quantitative or scientific facts, but rather bodies of rules for reaching morally 
and societally based goals.  Second order principles comprise of technicalities, 
policy details, and plans of action which are all subservient to first order 
principles (Devas 1892; Wolin 2004, chap. 9).  A salient point is that classical 
liberal theorists such as John Locke (1632 – 1704) and Adam Smith (1723 – 
1790) reasoned that liberal economics rendered first order principles 
redundant (Devas 1892, pp. 537 – 542, 552 – 558; Wolin 2004, chap. 9).  This 
research paper will argue that liberal reasoning on this is specious, and that it 
effectively veils the power motivations of those who benefit most from its 
precepts, namely significant controllers of capital (Healy 1967; Robbins 2011, 
chap. 3; Wolin 2004, chap. 9). 
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Considering the before mentioned, I will submit that liberal economic precepts 
can be divided mostly into five first-order assumptions:  
(1) The “consumer” is an accurate account of the person, and as such, 
should form the basis of any political-economy 
It would be a mistake to underestimate the concept of the individuated 
consumer; Liberalism’s most influential interpretation of the human person 
(Chang 2014, pp. 121 – 122; Edwards 2002, pp. 39 – 40; Robbins 2011, chap. 1).  
To emphasise this, McCracken (1988) argued that the consumer represented a 
first in human history: a non-religious agent allowed to wholly transform 
society on a continual and systematic basis over a sustained period.  What is 
more, the consumer helped enable, sustain, and grow liberalism’s primary 
economic manifestation, capitalism, and its later variant, globalisation (Chang 
2014, pp. 115 – 127; Robbins 2011, chap. 1; Steger 2013, pp. 75 – 77, 88, 135). 
The concept of the consumer can, arguably, be traced to Locke’s 
epistemological premise that a person’s interior world was impossible to fully 
know or understand; however, we could quantify his or her actions and 
purchases (Wolin 2004, pp. 268 – 269).  Thus, through demonstrable 
consumption we could best gage not only a person’s needs and desires, which 
Liberal economic theory assumed were endless (or could be made endless), but 
also the resources and the markets available to best satiate them (Chang 2014, 
pp. 121 – 122; Edwards 2002, pp. 53 – 63; Robbins 2011, chap. 1; Wolin 2004, 
pp. 268 – 269).   
Nevertheless, consumer norms initially represented far-reaching departures 
from traditional Western social norms (which were still evident into the 20th 
Century), such as contentment, frugality, modesty, self-denial, avoidance of 
waste, and a desire for self-sufficiency (Robbins 2011, chap. 1).  In contrast, the 
Liberal consumer represented a “rational”, self-centred “pleasure seeking 
machine” that possessed an anxious, free-floating desire for commodities.  
Moreover, consumerism transformed commodities from utilitarian items into 
signifiers of richer, more fulfilling lives (Chang 2014, pp. 120 – 121; Edwards 
2002, pp. 53 – 63; Robbins 2011, pp. 18 - 20).  Whilst no number of 
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commodities could satiate the consumer, the act of accumulation and 
consumption could prove temporarily therapeutic, and this anxious process 
helped to create a continual consumption cycle (Robbins 2011, chap. 1).  Thus, 
the role of the consumer became vital to the liberal capitalist project, 
particularly due to liberal capitalism’s non-negotiable requirement for 
continual growth (Hamilton 2003, pp. 1 -13; Harvey 2011).  And the fact that 
consumerism had to be consciously and persistently promoted by marketers, 
advertisers, government agents, public relations’ departments, academics, 
economists, celebrities, and journalists, amongst others, did not dissuade 
liberal theorists from their belief that the consumer was an accurate account of 
the human person (Robbins 2011, chap. 1).   
Liberal epistemology also contended that there was no stable reference point 
from which either the consumer, or consumer society, could claim firm identity.  
Rather, both the consumer and society were in constant revolutionary flux, and 
as such, it was best for both to embrace never-ending action, change, and 
(unsurprisingly) consumption (Wolin 2004, chap. 9).  Under the influence of 
such views, inventive progress and novelty became valorised, whilst traditional 
societal or environmental limits became obstacles to overcome.  However, 
exactly what society was supposed to progress towards was left purposely 
undetermined, since determination points implied expansionary limits, and 
“static” limits in liberal theory were harbingers of societal crises (Hamilton 
2003, pp. 1 – 13; Robbins 2011, chap. 3; Wolin 2004, chap. 9). 
The protean yet one-dimensional character of the consumer appears to fit well 
within the system’s focus of liberal economics (see Technocratic theory below) 
(Wolin 2004), especially since resource allocation systems within global 
capitalism need to be swiftly adaptable (Waitt, McGuirk, Dunn, Hartig & 
Burnley 2000, chaps. 8, 9).  However, the consumer archetype also seemed to 
avoid first-order anthropocentric needs for dignity, trusting cooperative 
relationships, healthy surrounds, and secure and stable domestic environments 
(Belloc 1946, Klein 2014, pp. 449 – 466; Uzawa 2005 pp. 1 - 14).  This 
represents, arguably, a confusion of theoretical orders; meaning, a confusion 
between uniquely anthropocentric goals, and the technocratic methods of 
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enabling them (Chesterton 1910, 1927; Edwards 2002, part 3).  Moreover, a 
system’s focus implicitly requires attention upon system’s management, rather 
than on the human-centred purpose for having a system (Edwards 2002, chaps. 
3, 7; Wolin 2004, chaps. 9, 10).  This disorder appears to reoccur throughout 
Liberal economic thought. 
(2) That fluid, competitive, and intersectional aggregations of 
individuated choices are self-correcting, efficient, and of first-order 
importance  
The baseline of Liberal economic thought can also arguably be traced to Locke’s 
(1632 – 1704) epistemological arguments insisting that society had no outside 
“prime-mover” force (such as God) to necessarily consult or oblige (Wolin 2004, 
chap. 9).  As such, everyone was, in effect, his or her own prime-mover, and that 
it was aggregations and intersections of individuated prime movers that drove 
society (A Dictionary of Philosophy 1996, pp. 240, 241 – 245; Chang 2014, pp. 
115 – 119; Edwards 2002, chap. 5; The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 
1995, pp. 437 – 440).  Liberal economic theory also contended that when 
individuated forces were left relatively alone, they naturally counter-balanced 
one another to form ordered, self-adjusting, and “natural” societies.  In addition, 
a society driven by multitudinous self-interests had authority, since it most 
accurately and efficiently reflected its members’ needs and wants.  Moreover, 
competitive processes ensured that there were meritocratic and impersonal 
allocations of resources, and that such method were, thus, “fair” (Allmendinger 
2002, chap. 5; Chang 2014, pp. 115 – 119; Edwards 2002, pp. 19 – 28, 39 – 43, 
64 – 65; Wolin 2004, chap. 9).  In contrast, collectives of persons and civil-
society groupings such as unions, religious groups, community groups, or even 
democratically elected governments who intervened into aggregated 
individuated processes “disturbed” them.  Such interventions were “unnatural”, 
and, thus, a threat to the fairness and efficiencies found within political-
economies organised through aggregates of individual consumers 
(Allmendinger 2002, chap. 5; Chang 2014, pp. 115 – 119; Edwards 2002, pp. 19 
– 28, 45; Wolin 2004, chap. 9).  Nevertheless, it also seemed that liberal 
economic theory marginalised the needs of persons for civil society and 
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political groups to begin with, as well as the needs for those groups to intervene 
into the political economy (Edwards 2002, pp. 65 – 68).   
(3) The economy is an authoritative, efficient, stand-alone entity of 
first order importance 
Classical liberal theorists, such as John Locke and Adam Smith, were awed by 
how regularised, competitive, contractual economic relationships created 
rhythmical social order in a “non-coercive” manner, and often within confined 
times and spaces.  They were further awed by how “natural” competitive 
market interdependencies “correctly”, efficiently, and “cooperatively” (re: 
contractually) allocated financial capital, workers, tasks, remunerations, 
workplace norms, and social prestige (Allmendinger 2002, chap. 5; Chang 2014, 
pp. 115 – 127; Edwards 2002, pp. 38 – 46; Wolin 2004, chap. 9).  For liberal 
theorists, the cumulative effect of these actions seemed alchemic, since a 
competitive free market together with economic contracts could take such 
diverse actions and persons, and transform them into disciplined aggregates of 
social power which entrepreneurs could then exploit (Wolin 2004, chap. 9). 
The result of such veneration was that for the first time the competitive market 
system was seen not as a construct and servant of the socio-political world, but 
as a stand-alone entity.  This epistemological manoeuvre soon meant that the 
roles became reversed, with the socio-political world being seen as dependent 
upon the economy, and with managers of the economy having rights to 
intervene into civil and political society (Chang 2014, pp. 115 – 127; Edwards 
2002, p. 9 & part 3; Wolin 2004, chap. 9).  This epistemological manoeuvre 
further propelled liberalism’s multiple arguments against democratically led 
market interventions.   For instance, Locke argued that political knowledge of 
communal desires and needs was impossible to demonstrate or quantify 
(Wolin 2004, p. 268).  However, individual desires and needs could be 
quantified through competitive market transactions and contracts, thus making 
the market, and not the government, the most efficient and precise mechanism 
to manifest consumer-citizen desires (Edwards 2002, pp. 53 – 63; Wolin 2004, 
chap. 9).  Liberal theory further argued that both the number and complex 
nature of societal relationships made it impossible for policy makers to ever 
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effectively craft policies to encompass them.  Thus, purposive political action 
could never accurately account for societal diversity, and by default, the 
individuated, competitive, contractual and consumer based market system was 
the only effective social ordering and wealth generating mechanism 
(Allmendinger 2002 chap. 5; Chang 2014, pp. 115 – 127; Edwards 2002, pp. 2 – 
28; Wolin 2004, p. 269).  All of which meant that some consumer- citizens were 
able to much better satiate their needs and desires, as well as exercise a lot 
more “market democracy” and societal input (control?), than others (Edwards 
2002).  However, such power asymmetries appear to not overly concern liberal 
theorists such as M& R Friedman (1990). 
(4) Technology, science, and technocratic method are authoritative, 
efficient, stand-alone entities of first order importance 
Technocratic theory appeared central to the historical “success” of liberal 
economics on two fronts.  Firstly, it helped draw decisive capital reserves 
towards leading controllers and owners of capital and away from distributed, 
localised sources; thus, helping to create unprecedented economies of scale and 
new production and distribution “efficiencies”.  Secondly, these new efficiencies 
enabled the manufacture of mass commodities to satiate an increasingly 
aggregated yet individuated consumer class (Epstein et al 2007; Wolin 2004, 
chap. 10).  Nevertheless, these same processes also helped to fracture 
traditional, localised Western political-economies and cultures (Belloc 1946; 
Wolin 2004); political-economies to which distributists partly takes stimulus 
from, and argue for their dynamism and continued relevance (Belloc 1946) (see 
Distributism: an analysis). 
Regarding technocratic (or organisational) theory, its leading theorist was 
Henri de Saint-Simon (1760 – 1825), who viewed society mostly as a terrain of 
utilitarian and integrated social functions which if properly coordinated could 
generate great material wealth and power.  That is, power for both state and 
corporate controllers of capital.  For de Saint-Simon, proper coordination 
meant conforming and centring societal relations around the most efficient 
business and organisational processes.  Once this was achieved, societal 
planners and controllers need only take command of strategic “control-points” 
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to redirect an entire society.  This efficient control was thought necessary, 
firstly, to counterbalance the anarchic tendencies of liberal subjectivism, and, 
secondly, to help ensure that entire societies could remain competitive within 
globalised capitalism (Wolin 2004, chap. 10).  However, the core case for 
technocratic theory both at its inception and now, is that only technocrats (or 
“experts”) possess the requisite knowledge and skills to engineer societal 
stability and prosperity amidst a world of constant technological and scientific 
revolutions.  In contrast, localised democratic mechanisms were thought 
incapable of managing complex global systems of information, production, 
distribution, and consumption (A Dictionary of Philosophy 1996, p. 377; 
Allmendinger 2002, chap. 3; The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 1995, p. 
707; Wolin 2004, chap. 10).  
Technocratic theory’s antidemocratic strains were, and are, multiple and deep 
(Allmendinger 2002, chap. 3; Ralston-Saul 1992, pp. 21 – 30; Wolin 2004, chap. 
10). Included was its wholesale adoption of scientific theory, which held that 
democratic society had no right to intervene into scientific or technological 
progress, and that scientists, engineers, and technologists were best able to 
help society when left alone.  de Saint-Simon and later technocrats openly 
acknowledged that such a theory was inherently elitist, and could prove 
coercive.  Furthermore, de Saint-Simon supposed that for technocracy to work 
it required passivity and servility from non-elites.  de Saint-Simon, however, 
thought worker passivity to be a positive since “the masses” preferred material 
well-being to fractious political and managerial involvements (Wolin 2004, 
chap. 10).  Moreover, technology and science were impersonal forces, and as 
such, did not impinge upon personal liberties.  Thus, for technocratic theorists, 
and especially de Saint-Simon, technological and scientific progress 
represented an authoritative, impersonal force in which to shape society (A 
Dictionary of Philosophy 1996, p. 377; Wolin 2004, chap. 10) - the same 
qualities which liberal theorists had earlier authored to “the market” (Wolin 
2004, chap. 9, 10).  These two “impersonal” forces soon coalesced seamlessly 
within liberal theory.  In fact, by the late 19th Century, the singular combination 
of the market, science, and technology appeared “natural” within liberal 
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economic theory, and as such, this combination was considered a “neutral” and 
powerfully authoritative, first-order political-economy force (Wolin 2004, pp. 
337 – 339).   
Technocratic theory also shared liberalism’s assessment of the person as 
consumer; however, it extended liberal theory, by arguing that only large 
technocratic organisations could adequately cater to large aggregations of 
individuated, subjectivist consumer choices (A Dictionary of Philosophy 1996, p. 
377; The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 1995, p. 707; Wolin 2004, chap. 
10).  Technocratic theory, intentionally or not, also generated the concept of the 
masses. Theorists such as de Saint-Simon argued that technocracy required 
workers’ expediency and conformity to production processes; not individuality 
or cultural norms.   Moreover, the largely standardised and aggregated roles of 
worker and consumer subordinated local civil-society identities, traditions, 
social structures, and cultures.  And these emerging roles required neither 
loyalty or consensus, much less studied deliberation or debate (New Catholic 
Encyclopedia QAT to SCR 1967, p. 948; Wolin 2004, chap. 10).  As a result, the 
non-elite class appeared (and still appears) mostly formless in technocratic 
theory, and this contrasted with traditional, Medieval political-economy models 
with their distinctive trades, guilds, and regional peasant cultures (Belloc 1946; 
Wolin 2004, chap. 10).  It also contrasted with the increased specialisation and 
sharper definitions assigned to the roles within the technocratic elite, whose 
individuation and status became clearer as the status of non-elites became 
opaquer (Ralston-Saul 1992, pp. 471 – 486; Wolin 2004, chap. 10).  
With regards to the technocracy itself, it was (and is) based on technocratic 
efficiency.  Efficiency in the technocratic sense is an effective coordination of 
different operations for a prescribed end, in an environment where participants 
make the “best” decisions regarding the needs of the organisation 
(Allmendinger 2002, chap. 3; Wolin 2004, pp. 367 – 368).  Note that worker 
consensus and deliberation are not essential; or even required.  Moreover, 
technocratic theorists have argued against participatory processes, seeing them 
as inefficient and even fractious (Allmendinger 2002, chap. 3; Lipman & Stokes 
2008; Wolin 2004, chap. 10).  In contrast, technocracies were thought to 
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require close collaboration between managers, administrators, scientists, 
technicians, engineers, and financial operatives all within elite meritocratic, and 
ultimately authoritarian, power structures (A Dictionary of Philosophy 1996, p. 
377; Allmendinger 2002, chap. 3; The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 1995, 
p. 707; Wolin 2004, pp. 317 – 323). 
A salient point is that de Saint-Simon’s technocratic theories are thought as 
applicable to Keynesian-nationalist political-economies as to liberal/neoliberal 
globalised political-economies (Stork 2010; Wolin 2004, chap. 10).  Whilst 
acknowledging John Maynard Keynes’ (1883 - 1946) vital importance to 
political-economy theory, this paper will not explicate Keynesian political-
economy, apart from stating that Keynesian theory reasoned that aggregations 
of individual decisions could in no way be trusted to properly steer a political-
economy; and as such, both regular government intervention and class based 
wealth redistributions were vital to ensure national fiscal solvency, full 
employment, industrial competitiveness, and societal harmony (Chang 2014, 
pp. 145 – 151, 168).  However, theorists such as Stork (2010), and Wolin 
(2004) have noted that technocratic theory, no matter the political-economy 
model it permeates, still rests upon the consumer archetype and its desire for 
maximising consumption.  Thus, technocratic efficiency appears not to 
reference anthropocentric purposes such as the needs of familial domesticity or 
the need for dignified, participatory work relations (Chesterton 1927; Wolin 
2004, chap. 10).  From this conclusion, it has been argued that if maximum and 
efficient production is the technocratic goal, and not the manifestation of 
distinctly anthropocentric needs, then shifts in political-economy models can 
be easily justified if newer models can be shown to generate more 
commodities, almost regardless of the societal impacts (Edwards 2002).  And it 
has been contended that this occurred, when from 1979 onwards multiple 
Keynesian-nationalist economies determinedly switched to globalised 
neoliberal economies, in large part because the later was supposed to produce 
more commodities (Chomsky 1994; Edwards 2002; Ralston -Saul 2005).  Thus, 
viewing technocratic efficiency as a first-order priority, such as the attendees at 
Davos appear too (Bailey 2017), appears nonsensical, since technocratic 
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method does not speak to uniquely anthropocentric concerns, but rather to 
system maximisation concerns.  Technocracy also arguably presents as 
“systems’ efficiency for efficiencies sake”, and that the system itself is a priority 
to which workers should conform, rather than the reverse.      
(5) Economic growth is of first order importance, even when this 
entails considerable negative externalities 
This is arguably Liberal economics most contentious first order priority 
(Hamilton 2003; Larson 2012).  Negative externalities are when the costs and 
impacts of a monetary transaction fall upon an unrelated party or parties, 
whilst those same parties gain no benefit from the transaction.  If negative 
externalities were included in the transaction costs, most commodities would 
be more expensive, and profit margins more modest (Bowman & Stone 2004; 
Larson 2012).  Thus, negative externalities effectively provide either a social or 
environmental subsidy (or both) for the global market economy.  Nevertheless, 
liberal economics, and the utilitarian arguments of M & R Friedman (1990) 
particularly, appear to view negative externalities as unavoidable, solvable, 
short-term accoutrements to consumer market and societal growth (Klein 
2014; Larson 2012).   
This utilitarian marginalisation of negative externalities, and the near negation 
of moral responsibility towards affected societal members and the 
environment, is not new to Liberal theory; indeed, the tradition appears 
venerable.  Locke himself argued that society and nature were hostile 
environments, and as such, their favours had to be forced from them.  Locke 
viewed such force as a positive, however, since nature was destitute of value 
without entrepreneurial exploitation, and society required entrepreneurial 
incursions to remain dynamic (Wolin 2004, chap. 9).  Whilst few would openly 
make such arguments now, this report would propose that liberal economics 
has, nevertheless, retained some of its original buccaneering spirit with its 
relaxed manner towards negative externalities (Klein 2014).  Similarly, liberal 
economics two main manifestations, capitalism and economic globalisation, 
both have non-negotiable structural requirements for growth, if either are to 
avoid financial collapse (Coe, Kelly & Yeung 2007, pp. 59 – 86; Hamilton 2003, 
 Page 30 of 112 
 
pp. 1 – 13; Harvey 1990, pp. 173 – 197; Harvey 2011; Robbins 2011, pp. 11 – 
32, 68 - 95).  Given this, it is perhaps unsurprising that negative externalities 
within liberalist rhetoric are often noticeable for their absence (for example, 
Macdonald-Smith [2013] and The Economist [2013, pp. 22 – 24, 58]).  A result 
of this considerable theoretical disorder is that an accounting schematic for 
negative externalities has either not yet been properly developed within Liberal 
theory; or has not yet been universally accepted and incorporated into global 
resource allocation cost structures (Chang 2014; Larson 2012; Lawrence, 
Richards & Lyons 2013; Uzawa 2005).  
Summary of global neoliberalism’s core components 
Neoliberal global leaders, such as the attendees at Davos, seemingly draw from 
an historical set of assumptions which reason that: persons are mostly 
individuated consumers; markets are independent, efficient, and fair 
distributors of wealth and power; science and technology are rightful societal 
change agents; technocratic elites are rightful managers of political-economy 
processes; contractual and competitive relations are better means to order 
society than cooperative processes; negative externalities are broadly 
justifiable when considering the benefits of economic growth; and that when 
individuated, subjectivist freedoms are joined with market freedoms both 
material and social prosperity ensue.  This powerfully totalising belief structure 
will be analysed below. 
Critique of Global Neoliberalism 
Self-identifying liberal, Ahmari (2016), argues that despite liberalism’s multiple 
issues, such as eye-opening social and financial inequalities (Alperovitz 2013; 
Piketty 2016), the history of Liberalism ‘has been the story of rights extended 
to ever more people’ (p. 41).  In addition, Liberalist consumer identities have 
helped create capitalist markets, and these in turn have helped grow society’s 
material wealth.  A salient point is that even Liberalism’s critics acknowledge 
its ability to produce multitudinous commodities (Hamilton 2003; Robbins 
2011).  However, for Ahmari (2016), consumer identities are not trivial, since 
they help grant visibility to otherwise marginal individuals and groups, and this 
process helps the peaceful societal absorption of new and diverse groups and 
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individuals (Ahmari 2016, pp. 46 – 47).  Ahmari (2016) continues that Liberal 
individuation has helped blunt destabilising and conflicting group ambitions, 
and even mitigated revolutionary movements.  In contrast, Ahmari (2016) 
argues that collectivist attempts to reorganise society have yielded mostly 
‘blood and fire’ (p. 55 - 56).  
Ahmari’s (2016) argument is elegant, and this paper will argue that clear and 
concise narratives have historically been a strength of both liberal theorists and 
leaders (Thatcher 1995).  However, part of this elegance derives, perhaps, from 
liberal economics’ considerable theoretical lacunas.  For instance, Ahmari’s 
(2016) implicit assumption that persons find fulfillment within individuated 
consumer identities.  Furthermore, Ahmari (2016) and liberal theorists such as 
Epstein et al (2007) do not appear to provide evidence to support the link 
between consumerism and life-satisfaction, apart from the normativity of 
global consumerism.  And according to Robbins (2011, p. 83), arguments such 
as Ahmari’s (2016), and neoliberal policy prescriptions more generally, 
assume: that persons are primarily motivated by material self-interest; that 
aggregations of self-interested actions together with the corporations which 
service them operate in society’s best interest; that competitive behaviour is 
better than cooperative behaviour; and that human progress is best measured 
by commodities produced, consumed, and accrued.  It also ignores the capital 
centralising, elitist nature of the Liberal political-economy project (Edwards 
2002, pp. 19 – 28, Rothkopf 2008; The Economist 2015, p. 9).  And significantly, 
it also appears to ignore the pre-Enlightenment, Christian pro-social heritage 
which Bowman & Stone (2004), Devas (1892, pp. 537 – 542), Haidt (2012, pp. 
246 – 273) and Wolin (2004, chap. 4 & pp. 300 - 307) all argue has consistently 
mitigated and subsidized Liberalism’s potentially chaotic individuated 
subjectivities. 
Regarding Liberalism’s first-order assumptions, the historical arguments against 
these are manifold.  Starting with the liberal archetype of “the consumer”, both 
Robbins (2011) and Devas (1892) have argued that the archetype is not only 
ahistorical, but unproven and even nonsensical.  According to Devas (1892, p. 
547), the consumer norm effectively means that ‘all men at all times’ and in all 
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situations, have the single-minded ‘characteristics of the members of the 
London Stock Exchange…’.  However, the contrary arguments presented by 
theorists such as Edwards (2002) and Hamilton (2003), which detail a person’s 
needs for dignified, community based, pro-social relationships appear more 
convincing.  From these arguments, this report contends that, at best, 
consumerism is a second-order means which may enable first-order pro-social, 
dignified relations and life satisfactions.  However, removed from these first-
order needs, consumerism may generate the reverse, and manifest socially 
ambiguous, materialistic, and selfish behaviours (Hamilton 2003, pp. 14 – 15, 
33 – 46).  
Another challenge to Liberal reasoning has been the doubts cast upon the 
theory that aggregations of competitive, individuated consumers operating 
within globalized “free-trade” economies produce comparatively self-
correcting, satisfied, and cohesive societies (M & R Friedman 1990; Wolin 2004, 
chap. 9 & pp. 587 – 590).  Sociological research has cast doubts on such 
assertions, especially with regards to the mental, social, and physical health 
outcomes of working-class persons in such settings (Case & Deaton 2015; Okie 
2010; Whitmore-Schanzenbach, Nunn & Bauer 2016).  One example of such 
research, was the nation-wide enquiry done by the Merck Family Fund in the 
United States (1995) into societal attitudes towards consumerism (Hamilton 
2003, pp. 14 – 15).  The researchers found broad societal consensus that 
consumerism propelled materialistic, greedy, and selfish social relationships, 
whilst marginalizing pro-social behaviours that assisted families, friendships, 
and social care.  Furthermore, participants saw the competitive ‘lust’ for 
commodities as the primary cause of crime, marital breakdown, drug addiction, 
and environmental degradation.  And whilst participants commonly admitted 
to consumerism, they also admitted to conflicts of conscience regarding the fact 
(Hamilton 2003, pp. 14 -15, 33 - 46).  These behaviours appear to be the 
converse of self-correcting.  
Similarly, all previous economic interpretations (including liberalism’s 
antecedent, mercantilism) argued that private interests more-often-than-not 
ran contrary to public interests, and ‘that divers persons might seek their own 
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singular profit to the common hurt and damage of the people, and regard more 
their own private lucre than the common weal and surety of the realm’ (Devas 
1892, p. 551).  Moreover, liberalism’s high regard for the rationality of the 
consumer has itself been argued as irrational (Hamilton 2003) (for example, 
consumer demands for smoking and gambling); so too the consumer’s ability to 
harmonize “its” interests with local, national, and international interests (for 
example, the U.S sub-prime loans crisis, or ocean plastics’ pollution crisis) 
(Alperovitz 2013, pp. 1 – 21, Klein 2014; Piketty 2016). 
Liberalism’s high regard for individuated social and economic freedoms also 
overlooks the fact that the most powerful, competitive, combative, conspiring, 
articulate, and exploitive often seem to work best within competitive 
individuated environments.  In contradistinction, broad-based, communal, and 
democratic interventions are often the only means for the less powerful, 
competitive, and articulate to contest socio-economic processes (Edwards 
2002; Klein 2014).  In addition, Bowman & Stone (2004) and even John Locke 
himself (Wolin 2004, chap. 9) have argued that both liberal economics and 
liberal individualism is reliant upon a widespread dispersal of pre-
Enlightenment, Christian, pro-social morality for them to work; or to be even 
considered possible.  As such, these pre-Enlightenment, pro-social, traditional, 
Christian behaviours have provided an inestimable, and mostly 
unacknowledged subsidy towards the entire liberal project (Bowman & Stone 
2004; Devas 1892; Haidt 2012, chap. 11; Wolin 2004, chap. 9). 
This often unacknowledged and arguably enormous subsidy of pro-social, 
Christian heritage also better allowed Classical Liberal theorists, such as Adam 
Smith and John Locke, to theoretically separate the economy from politics and 
society (Devas 1892; Wolin 2004, chap. 9).  This theoretical manoeuvre, which 
took widespread cooperative behaviours for granted, effectively placed the 
economy above not just politics, but also society.  From this position it became 
logical to insist that neither government or social interventions into the 
economy were justifiable.  Thus, liberal theory, arguably, obfuscated the 
personal, familial, cultural, and societal first-order reasons for having an 
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economy to begin with and made the economy seem necessary for its own sake 
(Devas 1892, pp. 537 – 544; Edwards 2002).   
The arguments against these theoretical moves are persuasive.  For instance, 
liberal theorists have historically overstated the “natural” spontaneity of the 
market, and, contrariwise, understated the vast regulatory and social 
framework that any market needs to survive.  The modern market economy 
could not exist without the constructed orders of limited liability companies, 
central banks, intellectual property laws, government trade agreements, and 
zoning regulations etc.  In fact, market “order” is as much dependent upon 
socio-political boundaries and interventions as it is private transactions.  What 
is more, the market itself is a social and moral construct.  ‘It is based on 
deliberately designed rules and regulations that prohibit certain things (for 
instance, crystal meth), discourage others (for instance, cigarettes) and 
encourage still others (for instance, OH&S training).  In addition, the 
boundaries of the market are socially and politically drawn and redrawn with 
regularity’ (Chang 2014, pp. 140 -141). 
Moreover, the successful examples whereby societies and nations have made 
the economy the servant of societal goals are numerous (Edwards 2002, pp. 11 
- 14 & chap. 2; Watson, Buchanan, Campbell & Briggs 2003, chap. 2).  An 
example is the Australian Settlement project from 1901 till approximately 1980, 
in which consecutive national governments used a range of tools such as 
infrastructure projects, tariffs, training, and industry subsidies to consciously 
build a “workers’ paradise” of low unemployment, dignified work, good wages, 
egalitarianism, strong social bonds, and a high standard of living for all classes 
(Edwards 2002, p.11 – 14; O’Neill 2010; Watson et al 2003, chap. 2).  In fact, 
post-World War II migrants were attracted to Australia using these claims.  And 
whilst the Australian Settlement project was not faultless (and perhaps not 
“paradise”), it was broadly successful, and a valid rebuttal to the claim that only 
neoliberal free markets produce prosperity and social harmony (Edwards 
2002, p.11 – 14; Watson et al 2003, chap. 2) 
Moreover, modern theorists as diverse as Alperovitz (2013), Edwards (2002), 
Hamilton (2003), Klein (2014) and Stiglitz & Charlton (2005) have argued that 
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most citizens view the economy as a second order principle/means to help 
achieve first-order personal, familial, and common goals.  And as such, the 
broad societal view of the economy remains stubbornly pre-Enlightenment era.  
And historical theorists such as Devas (1892, p. 551) further argued, that 
liberalism represented not just a philosophical break from all previous 
interpretations of economics, where the economy was viewed as a facilitator of 
the common good, but a degradation of economics into an art focused upon the 
maximum production and consumption of commodities. 
Regarding technological progress and technocratic processes as first-order 
priorities, perhaps the clearest view of such reasoning can be seen in the 
current arguments of self-professed techno-anarchists, techno-freedom-
futurists (Bartlett 2017), and Silicon Valley technology futurists (such as 
Weinstein [2017]).  Such technology advocates and apologists continue de 
Saint-Simon’s 18th Century views (A Dictionary of Philosophy 1996, p. 377; 
Wolin 2004, chap. 10) largely unaltered, and argue that technological and 
scientific progress are propulsive and unstoppable, and that nationalist 
attempts to intervene are futile.  They further argue that modern technologies 
must be accepted on the “tech-savvy” experts’ terms, and that only experts can 
properly understand and navigate these ever-changing and complex global 
technocratic systems.  These “facts” necessarily sideline popular political 
participation, as well as entrenching the wealth and power of technocratic and 
entrepreneurial elites.  However, these new elites will also produce an 
abundance of commodities and technological amazements, although to what 
purpose is unclear.  More menacingly, the same theorists do not rule out the 
possibilities for dystopic transitional periods, in which, according to Bartlett 
(2017), ‘millions of economically valueless citizens’ are left scraping ‘out an 
existence as a (precarious) client class’ to a ‘small number of tech mega-
monopolies and crypto-anarchist geniuses…’. 
Arguably, such menacing predictions derive from technocratic theory’s 
discernment of societal members as mostly systems’ components which must 
be enacted upon, rather than persons to be collaborated with (Chesterton 1927; 
Wolin 2004, chap. 10).  These discernments appear to rest upon the 
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contentious belief that aggregations of consumer desires, serviced by corporate 
controlled resource allocation systems, are the most efficient means to produce 
both personal satisfactions and common goods (Bailey 2017, Edwards 2002, 
chap. 5; Wolin chap. 10).  Regarding common goods, these appear to be mostly 
technological amazements, personal identity freedoms, and multitudinous 
goods and services (Bailey 2017; Hamilton 2003).  As such, democratic 
interventions which respond to concerns over time and stability requirements 
for families, or pro-social community relations, or desires for cooperative and 
participatory work relationships (Uzawa 2005, pp. 1 – 5; Glover 2015; Watson 
et al 2003, chaps. 2, 3), may appear not only superfluous, but hazardous to 
technocratic systems’ efficiencies (Bartlett 2017).  It is these theoretical 
discernments which, arguably, help explain why technocratic and liberal 
theorists frame the economy as a protean resource allocation system which the 
broader public must suffer and serve (Ralston-Saul 2005, chap. 5; Robbins 
2011, chaps. 2,3), rather than a social construct and a means to foster citizen 
empowerment and the common good. 
Finally, much liberal economic rhetoric, (for instance, Macdonald-Smith [2013], 
Potter [2013], and The Economist [2013, pp. 22 – 24 & 58]) appears to omit or 
downplay the impacts and costs of negative externalities.  Moreover, liberal 
theorists (for instance, M & R Friedman 1990) seem to have not devised an 
externalities accounting schematic, or at least not one that is broadly accepted 
and implemented, and instead appear to mostly frame negative market 
externalities as short-term, solvable issues (Larson 2012).     
A converse view comes from environmental scientists (Larson 2012) who view 
negative externalities as first-order issues, because of their widespread 
pervasiveness and daunting, inter-connecting, and unpredictable cumulative 
impacts.  These accumulations (such as global warming and the ocean plastics’ 
pollution crises) have the capabilities to create global scale environmental 
failures.  This minimisation of negative market externalities upon social and 
environmental structures is, arguably, liberalism’s most pressing principle 
disorder (Klein 2014; Larson 2012 pp. 3 – 16; Lawrence, Richards & Lyons 
2013). 
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Liberal economics: Concluding statement  
This paper proposes that liberal economic theory effectively assigns first-order 
status to aggregated and subjectivist consumer demands, technocratic 
processes, economic growth, and technological and scientific innovations 
(Hamilton 2003; Robbins 2011; Wolin 2004).  Within this framework the 
political-economy’s key role appears to be a producer of goods, services, and 
technological amazements.  From a distributist analysis, however, these are all 
second-order means which may enable first-order priorities and are, thus, not 
“good” in and of themselves.  Nevertheless, historical liberal theorists such as 
Locke (Wolin 2004, chap. 9) and modern liberal theorists such Epstein et al 
(2007) and M & R Friedman (1990), have essentially argued that these 
products enable individuals to manifest their own interpretations of the good 
life, and aggregations of these good lives create good societies.  In response, this 
thesis offers that there are noteworthy lacunas in this reasoning.  These include 
the first-order, anthropocentric and societal needs for healthy environments 
(Klein 2014), stable familial domesticity (Watson et al 2003), dignified and 
participatory work relations (Bowman & Stone 2004; Glover 2015; Howard 
2012) and confident, trust-worthy, pro-social, participatory, and cooperative 
civil-society interactions (Uzawa 2005).  These are all mostly gained, or at least 
enabled, through broader collaborative, societal processes that extend past the 
individual and technocratic market mechanisms (Alperovitz 2013; Klein 2014).  
Thus, from distributist and other historical political-economy viewpoints 
(Chesterton 1910; Devas 1892), liberal economic priorities are disordered, and 
this syndrome inevitably produces broad sustainability issues no matter the 
theory’s transmutation (such as, neoliberal globalisation). 
This apparent confusion of priority sets also, arguably, manifests weighty 
contradictions, with perhaps the most obvious being that subjectivist, 
individuated consumers seem to require objectivist, technocratic, command 
and control, corporate, global resource allocation systems to satiate and initiate 
wants and needs (Robbins 2011).  Such systems inexorably centralise power 
and capital away from most individuals and communities (Alperovitz 2013; 
Piketty 2016).  Evidence of which includes the neoliberal era eye-opening 
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increases in global economic inequalities, whereby asymmetrical wealth 
growth by capital controlling elites appears to mostly track implementations of 
neoliberal economic reforms (Alperovitz 2013; Piketty 2016).  Further 
evidence includes the neoliberal global trade and governance structures which 
appear to circumvent, or even negate, both local and national democratic and 
civil-society processes whilst rewarding capital controlling elites (AFTINET 
2015; Gleeson, Lopert & Moir 2014; Public Citizen 2014). 
Thus, whilst technocratically produced commodities have been distributed 
widely, though unevenly, via liberal economic systems, empowering capital 
control appears to have been deeply concentrated (Alperovitz 2013).  None of 
which is perhaps surprising if a political-economy is focused upon “efficient” 
commodity production and delivery systems (or second-order priorities) and 
not so much upon uniquely anthropocentric requirements (first-order 
priorities) (Chesterton 1927). 
This paper’s next section explicates a theory which claims to address the 
hegemony of liberalism and its priority disorders; namely, distributism.  Its 
economic and organisational prescriptions stem from its conception of first-
order priorities, and ones in which market mechanisms, whilst vital, are 
subservient to anthropocentric needs (Chesterton 1910, 1927; Belloc 1946).  
Its theorists also argue that the main problem with the liberal free market is 
that it is not free enough; meaning that most persons have not the capital to 
engage (or not engage) in the economy in an empowered manner, and this 
produces servile rather than dignified economic relationships for the majority 
(Chesterton 1927; Belloc 1946).  As such, the concept of empowered ownership 
and control of capital, together with economic models which refer to first-order 
priorities, are central to distributist theory (Chesterton 1927). 
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6. Distributism: an analysis 
 
Distributism – context and synopsis  
The Distributist manifesto is the 1891 papal encyclical Rerum Novarum 
(Mathews 2007, 2008 [A]) which was written by Pope Leo Xlll as a response to, 
and a refutation of, Marx and Engels’ Communist Manifesto.  However, it was 
equally a refutation of liberal economics and epistemology, which was then, as 
now, the hegemonic global political-economy discourse.  Pope Leo XIII argued 
that liberal individuated “freedoms” had primarily manifested freedoms for 
volatile capital controlling elites to impose ‘misery and wretchedness’ upon 
working-class majorities.  This was partly a result of the implementation of 
Adam Smith’s individuated, contractual based political-economy model. A 
model which, the encyclical stressed, nowhere near allowed for the diversity of 
human relations, especially civil society and familial.  A salient point is that 
Smith’s model also ignored the pro-social and common capital (see The 
Common Good below) which subsidised and allowed such contractual 
relationships to be at all viable (Uzawa 2005, p. 1).  Pope Leo XIII further 
argued that materialist systems focused on the maximum production of 
consumer commodities (whether capitalist or socialist) inevitably failed to 
address first-order human needs, such as human needs for dignity, respect, 
family stability, harmonious and strengthening relationships, meaningful civic 
participation, and the ability to say no to either market or bureaucratic 
coercions (Belloc 1946; Uzawa 2005, pp. 1 – 3).          
In response to Rerum Novarum, distributist theorists emerged (Chesterton and 
Belloc being the principal ones) (Mathews 2007) who argued that the main 
issue was inequitable access to capital, and that labour should own, hire, and 
direct capital; and not the reverse.  Capital in this paper will mean an 
accumulation of excess wealth derived from previous production which has been 
stored, or is looking to be stored, in safe and profitable settings for both present 
and future use (Belloc 1931, p. 13).  Capital is mostly thought of as financial, 
however, it can also include the means of production, material assets, as well as 
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social prestige, influence, aesthetic tastes, and social and work skills. 
(Abercrombie, Hill & Turner 2006, pp. 35 - 36)    For distributists (and others 
besides), capital is a necessity of any political-economy system, and, moreover, 
that political and social power typically follows capital power, or the controllers 
thereof (Alperovitz 2013, Chesterton 1927, Grattan Institute 2010; Minnery 
2007).  As a result, distributists argued that capital should be widely controlled, 
owned, and distributed, as well as family and community focused (Chesterton 
1927; Chojnowski 2011; Belloc 1946; Medaille 2011; Schmude 2016).  In fact, 
Chesterton (1927) reasoned that capitalism should be renamed proletarianism, 
since the systems’ most obvious manifestation was a proletariat majority 
without meaningful ownership of, or access to, capital.  And whilst distributists 
conceded the need for state-owned enterprises, they dismissed the claims of 
egalitarianism made by state-socialists, since democratic-socialist models were 
thought to invariably require control by elite technocrats (Chesterton 1927; 
Belloc 1946; Blond 2009; Storck 2010). 
Either way, distributists argued that both capitalism and state-socialism 
suffered from the same first-order principle disorders; meaning that both were 
focused on maximum production of consumer goods and services, rather than 
on the persons and the society they were meant to serve.  This disordering 
resulted in policies where most persons were primarily viewed as either 
resource inputs or consumers, and where society and the environment were 
primarily viewed as resources for entrepreneurs and managers of global 
resource allocation systems.  In contrast, distributism remained determinedly 
qualitative in focus, emphasising the need for dignity and respect for persons, 
and the needs for dignified relationships (especially within the family) and a 
sense of civic membership and order (Chojnowski 2011; Schwindt 2016; Sibley 
2016; Stork 2010, 2011, 2012).  And, arguably, like all political-economy foci, 
these stemmed from an epistemology.  
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Distributist epistemology 
I will propose that distributist epistemology can be divided into five first-order 
principles, and these I have organised below.   
(1) The Person 
In both distributist epistemology and in its Catholic epistemological source, a 
person is an individual with inherent rights, obligations, and dignity which the 
law, the economy, and the broader society are obliged to recognize and secure.  
There is also solidarity between persons that constitutes a form of “corporate 
personality”; however, this does not equate to ‘any form of collectivism that 
reduces the human person to a means’ (New Catholic Encyclopedia 1967, pp. 
170 – 171).  Distributists (Chesterton [1908] especially) further stressed the 
importance of the human personality and its distinctiveness and autonomy 
from the natural world.  Distributists also emphasised human qualities such as 
spirituality, self-consciousness, morality, freedom, rationality, purposefulness, 
initiative, and responsibility (Chesterton 1908, 1910; New Catholic 
Encyclopedia 1967, pp. 172 – 174).  
A further distributist concept is Panis Humanis; which is the right possessed by 
all persons to acquire the necessities of life, and that part of life’s necessities is 
human dignity and dignified social relationships (Belloc 1931, p. 220).  A 
dignified life axiomatically includes the ability to vigorously negotiate work 
contracts for just recompense and conditions.  However, the ability to 
vigorously and fairly negotiate largely rests on the ability to resist market 
based coercions.  As such, the ability to say no to market mechanisms is linked 
to economic self-sufficiency (at least for survival), confidence in one’s social 
networks, and a keen sense of self and moral self-worth (Belloc 1931, p. 220; 
Belloc 1946).  It is perhaps a unique political-economy feature of Distributism 
that it places such emphasis on personal dignity. 
In contrast, distributists argued that liberal market based coercions produced 
mostly servility and subservience, and that both qualities were inimical to 
Personhood (Chesterton 1927; Belloc 1931; Blond 2009; Sibley 2016).  In fact, 
distributists contended that within a well-functioning distributive society, one 
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would ‘marvel at the insolence of the poor… at the rebellious, vigorous 
personalities discernible upon every side’ (Belloc 1946, pp. 114 – 115).  And 
whilst both liberal and technocratic theories seemed to view labour as mostly 
formless material to use or work upon, distributists viewed labour as persons 
to both collaborate with, and learn from (Belloc 1946, p. 121). 
Another core component of distributist personhood is the freedom and ability to 
bind oneself; that is, to express passionate loyalty to, and identification with, 
cultures and beliefs that are locality linked and developed over generations 
(Blond 2009; Chesterton 1905, 1927).  Such qualities have historically been 
linked to working-class culture, and as such, have arguably been perceived by 
technocrats and capital controllers as barriers to the smooth allocation and 
maximisation of labour resources, within fast changing resource allocation 
systems (Hamilton 2002, pp. 98 – 121, 147 – 173; Goodhart 2017; Robbins 
2011, chap. 2).  Chesterton (1905) and Goodhart (2016, 2017) have also argued 
that many capitalist, academic, and technocratic elites have rarely felt, or seen 
much need for, such attachments, and as a result are often cool and dismissive 
towards working class loyalties.  Nonetheless, it has been argued that working 
class attachments to communal groups, traditional norms, familial security and 
safety, and familiar localities can act as bulwarks against liberalist needs for 
workplace plasticity, location flexibility, and a harried globalised workforce 
(Chesterton 1905; Goodhart 2017; Robbins 2011, chap. 2). 
Furthermore, it appears that in distributist thought the ability to bind oneself is 
intimately linked to the ability to participate in work, community and national 
affairs (Chesterton 1905).  Participation in work or community life generally is 
thought crucial to the well-being of the person (Warhurst 1996).  However, for 
participation to be orderly and fruitful, distributists and others have argued 
that it requires stable, pro-social institutions (such as stable families, Church 
groups, and civic institutions) to perform the acculturation processes needed 
for participation.  A salient point is that the right to participate does not require 
people to do politics or civic participation well, merely that they do it for 
themselves (Chesterton 1910).  In contrast, global market mechanisms, 
technocratic efficiencies, and globalist-consumerist goods have been argued as 
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inadequate replacements for civic participation and attachments (Hamilton 
2003; Sinclair 2017; Warhurst 1996).  Thus, distributists argued that a person’s 
requirements for dignity, loyalty, familial stability; fruitful social participation, 
spiritual development, and the ability to say no to market-based coercions (see 
the Good Life below), all required definite and stable pro-social characteristics 
together with political-economy structures that respected and enabled these 
(Belloc 1946; Chesterton 1908, 1927). 
(2) The Common Good 
For traditional distributists such as Chesterton (1908) and Belloc (1931), their 
conceptual common good would have subscribed to the Catholic equivalent, 
one which embraced ‘the sum total of conditions of social living… (in which all 
persons could) more fully and more readily… achieve their own perfection’ 
(Mater et Magistra in New Catholic Encyclopedia 1967, p. 762).  It is on this 
point that the epistemological differences between liberalism and distributism 
are plainest; since the liberal common good embraces a political-economy 
terrain in which competing political, social, and economic ideas can rationally 
interact, compete, and justify their respective positions.  Moreover, the 
common good in liberalism is thought to be a doubtful concept, and one that is 
better for the individual to decide for themselves (Abercrombie et al 2006, p. 
132; Wolin 2004, Chapter Nine).  Yet, even at the individual level the two 
theories differ.  An example would be a liberal economic analysis of the good 
regarding a bought sandwich; this analysis would focus primarily on the most 
efficient production methods, consumer desirability, and profit potential; in 
contrast, a distributist analysis would focus primarily on the benefits to the 
person who ate the sandwich, and the good (or otherwise) it generated for the 
environment and wider community (Chesterton 1935; Schwindt 2016; Uzawa 
2005) 
Apart from widely distributed financial capital (see The Good Life below), the 
distributist common good would contain a developed social common capital;  a 
concept which includes the regenerative health of the natural world, the 
viability of public infrastructure both social and material (public transport, 
roads, potable water, sewage, hospitals, police, judiciary, education etc.), and 
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social capital such as intangible networks of trust, reciprocal altruism, stable 
familial domesticity, social aversion to corruption, free exchange of 
information, pro-social traditions, confidence with democratic processes, and 
tangible assets such as artwork and valued historic buildings (Uzawa 2005, pp. 
1 – 5; Warhurst 1996).  Nevertheless, distributists (such as Chesterton [1910] 
would also acknowledge that deciding the preferred composition of the 
common good is a contentious process; so contentious, they argued, that 
political-economists and sociologists have historically settled for identifying 
socio-economic-environmental “issues”, rather than explicating the ideal 
scenario from which they implicitly draw their critiques.  As an example, 
Chesterton (1910) argued that commentators and academics have at times 
agreed upon what constitutes abject poverty; but not on what constitutes 
dignified, healthy, and sustainable poverty.  Because of such contentions, 
distributists and others have argued that liberal theorists have often 
withdrawn into second-order, economic growth focused task sets, rather than 
craft policies aimed towards clearly explicated societal and environmental 
objectives (Hamilton 2002; Chesterton 1927; Uzawa 2005). 
(3) The Good Life 
The good life in distributism is part of a broad Catholic discourse relating to the 
qualities of virtue (Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church 2004); 
however, this paper will focus on the three political-economy aspects of the 
good life: the economic supports of capital ownership; the importance of work 
arrangements which foster family and community relationships; and the 
importance of social commonalities.  With regards to the first point, Belloc 
(1946, p. 87) surmised that a capital owner in sickness or repose is no more 
productive than an unemployed citizen.  However, a capital owner’s ‘life is 
balanced and regulated by his reception of rent and interest as well as wages.  
Surplus values come to him, and are the fly-wheel balancing the extremes of his 
life and carrying him over his bad times’.  Thus, for distributists, the ability to 
survive at least temporarily off capital assets and social supports, and not be 
servilely dependent upon government systems or precarious wage contracts, is 
a cornerstone of the good life (Belloc 1946; Chesterton 1927).   
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Regarding the second aspect, the rights of domesticity appear central to the 
distributist good life, and that political-economy structures should consciously 
factor in, and prioritise, the time and requirements necessary to foster strong 
familial relations (Chesterton 1927).  The third aspect emphasises that large 
political-economy structures should focus upon requirements common to all, 
and that such a focus could be resource efficient and help foster social trust 
(Uzawa 2005).  The Australian Settlement project from 1901 till 1980 was 
perhaps a successful example of this, whereby built infrastructure and wages, 
employment, social services, and industry policies were directed towards 
building broad social trust, cohesion, and wellbeing (Edwards 2002; O’Neill 
2010; Watson et al 2003).  Distributists, and others, further argue that for most 
persons the good life cannot be left to global market mechanisms alone, and it 
thus requires frequent democratic interventions into the economy (Blond 
2009; Edwards 2002; Watson et al 2003).   
(4) Subsidiarity 
Subsidiarity emphasises the roles and duties of respective societal groups.  A 
core part of subsidiarity is that larger corporate bodies, whether public or 
private, should not appropriate duties or tasks that could be better done by 
communities, families or individuals.  Similarly, the broader political-economy 
should enable smaller societal units to take charge of the roles closest and most 
appropriate to them.  Such an allocation of roles is thought to deter servility, 
and foster personal and familial dignity.  Nevertheless, subsidiarity still 
requires larger public policies, infrastructures, supplements, supports, and 
regulations; however, such laws and provisions would need to be aimed 
towards the empowerment of communities, families and individuals (Pontifical 
Council for Justice & Peace 2005, pp. 93 - 95).  
Subsidiarity emerged as a reaction to 19th Century and early 20th Century 
Liberal society, whereby Catholic theorists such as Belloc (1946) and 
Chesterton (1910) argued that capitalism had largely evaporated the 
cooperative protections of traditional guilds, extended families, and community 
groups, and replaced them, for the most part, with working class individuals, 
powerful market players, and newly powerful governments.  The argument 
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continued that without the bulwarks of the traditional, localised societal groups 
and networks, the government was left as the primary defender of working 
class persons against capitalist exploitation (New Catholic Encyclopedia SCU - 
TEX 1967, pp. 762 – 763).  However, Catholic theorists such as Chesterton 
(1910) and Belloc (1946) further argued that this often led to invasive 
government interference into both working class families and communities, 
and resulted in widespread servile, fearful dependencies upon government 
supports.  Moreover, in distributist thought the entire process was disordered, 
since the family was society’s most important and central institution - not the 
government or the market – and this centrality should have been reflected 
within employment and socio-political structures (Chesterton 1927; Mathews 
2008; Pontifical Council for Justice & Peace 2005, pp. 93 - 95 &).  
(5) Authority 
Distributists never subscribed to the liberal belief that market mechanisms, 
together with consumer demands, held societal authority (Chesterton 1908; 
Belloc 1931).  However, what could claim authority were familial requirements, 
democratic processes, and social, economic, and environmental goods aimed 
towards civic minded ends (the common good) (New Catholic Encyclopedia 
AZT 1967, pp. 1111 – 1113).  The theory continued that if authority was 
severed from common participation and common goals, it would begin to 
fragment society and take on an arbitrary and incoherent nature.  What is more, 
it could allow group desires for power and domination to go unchecked, and to 
even become valorised (Kozinski 2012; Schwindt 2016; Stork 2010, 2011). 
Summation of Distributist epistemology: Conservatism 
Distributism and Catholic political-economy thought more generally appear to 
have a socially conservative, pre- “Enlightenment” epistemology which could be 
best surmised as ‘the extra-political claims of the soul’ (Wolin 2004, chap. 4).  
In the Medieval European worldview, this meant that all relationships should 
be aimed at helping persons reach heaven and stay out of hell, and that persons 
had the right to reconfigure the political-economy around this perceived (and 
urgent) necessity (Wolin 2004, chap. 4).  As such, it would be better if 
relationships were primarily dignified, cooperative, civic minded, respectful, 
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traditional, and family and locality centric, and only occasionally competitive, 
individuated, and consumerist (Belloc 1931,1946; Chesterton 1910, 1927). 
Alternatively, a secular interpretation of distributist conservatism could 
include: the rights to family domesticity; the centrality of dignity, respect, and 
participatory civic membership; the centrality of cooperative, pro-social 
relations and traditions; and the centrality of social commonalities from which 
solidarities might be built (Blond 2009; Mathews 2007, 2008 [B]; Uzawa 2005; 
Warhurst 1996). 
In contrast, liberal conservatism appears to reference the centrality of market 
mechanisms, the rights of individuals to decide for themselves what is good, 
and the centrality of aggregated consumer demands (Epstein et al 2007; M & R 
Friedman 1990; Thatcher 1995, pp. 565 – 601; Wolin 2004, chap. 9).  Not 
surprisingly, both sets of respective theorists seem to view their counterparts 
with suspicion (Epstein et al 2007; Wolin 2004, chap. 9), which is perhaps 
inevitable, since the two epistemologies are irreconcilable.  Nevertheless, this is 
not to argue that policy compromises could not be reached between the two, 
but rather that the differences cannot be underplayed. 
Mondragon: Distributism manifested 
A salient point is that Belloc (1946) had emphasised the importance of 
cooperatives and cooperative networks that enable broadly dispersed capital 
ownership and control.  This emphasis derived in part from his explication of 
Medieval political-economies (The Servile State), and the distributive, 
sophisticated, and wealth producing possibilities that these alternative “free-
market” models possessed (Belloc 1946).  And whilst Chesterton (1927) and 
Belloc (1946) did much to develop distributist theory during the first half of the 
20th Century, it was parish priest and distributist, Father Arizmendierietta (Fr 
Arizmendi for short), (Mathews 2003, 2008 [A]) who most successfully 
manifested it in practice through his establishment of the Mondragon 
Corporacion Cooperativa (MCC).  And it was through MCC, in part, that 
distributism’s links to cooperatives and cooperative networks became 
cemented (Mathews 2003).    
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7. What is Mondragon (MCC)? 
 
As of 2017, the Mondragon Corporacion Cooperativa (MCC) was comprised of 
276 worker-owned and democratically operated cooperatives, with 
approximately 75,000 worker-owners, as well as approximately 10,000 
employees outside of Spain mostly employed through MCC owned private 
businesses (Geoghegan 2017, p. 24).  The largely autonomous MCC 
cooperatives vary notably in their output, and this product multiplicity has 
helped MCC mitigate and counterbalance economic downturns, as well as 
provide diverse opportunities for growth (Mathews 2003, 2008 [A], 2012; 
Bowman & Stone 2004).  Nevertheless, all the co-ops and private enterprises 
are linked and coordinated via an overarching, democratically elected body, the 
Mondragon Corporacion Cooperativa [MCC]) (Schwartz 2009).  All MCC co-ops 
fall into one of four categories: finance (banking and insurance); industry 
(including automotive, machine tools, appliances and electronics); distribution; 
and knowledge (including primary, secondary and tertiary education, plus 12 
technical schools) (Azkarraga-Etxagibel, Cheney & Udaondo 2012, p. 76).  
Furthermore, MCC is presently (and has been for decades) the largest private 
firm in the Basque country (both in term of employees and sales) and one of 
largest firms in Spain (Geoghegan 2017; Ridley-Duff 2010). 
Integral to MCC’s success has been its ability to maintain reserve funds for 
expansion, and to avoid all dependencies upon capitalist finance and outside 
shareholders.  For a global organisation, this fact alone is extraordinary.  
Furthermore, MCC’s financial independence has been key to its success, since 
outside shareholders and creditors have been shown consistently to either 
bankrupt or corporatize mutual organisations and cooperatives (Matthews 
2003, 2008 [A]; Bowman & Stone 2004).  MCC’s reserve funds have also been 
used to cover the losses of struggling co-ops whilst they undertook necessary 
restructuring (Forcadell 2005).  As a result, few co-ops have experienced 
bankruptcy or worker lay-offs during recessionary years (Davidson 2012; 
Matthews 2012; Whyte 1999).  In fact, as of 2012, ‘less than 6 of the one 
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hundred and twenty co-ops have failed over fifty years’ (Davidson 2012, p. 
233).  Moreover, during the Global-Financial-Crisis (GFC) no co-op failed, salary 
reductions were modest, and retrenchments were limited to trial period 
workers.  MCC also soon recovered from the GFC (despite Spain’s deep and 
protracted downturn), and began to expand once more (Davidson 2012; 
Mathews 2012). 
 In addition, control over its own finances has allowed MCC to loan successful 
worker-owner applicants (usually after a 6-month trial period) the monies for 
the share acquisitions necessary for membership.  These loans can typically be 
paid back incrementally and at no interest.  A salient point is that retiring or 
leaving workers must “cash-out” their shares to prevent outside share 
ownership; however, these considerable “cash-outs” are also a reminder of the 
distributed capital ownership and financial security of MCC workers.  
Moreover, this is capital that workers control and receive dividends from whilst 
remaining at MCC (Davidson 2012; Geoghegan 2017; Matthews 2003, 2008 [A]; 
Whyte 1999).  This paper would argue that such a combination in part 
manifest’s Belloc’s “fly-wheel” of capital ownership, and represents substantial 
financial security for worker-owners  
With regards to MCC’s democratic policy, it is strictly one-worker-one-vote, 
with salaries being democratically decided and taken as a share of business 
profits (that is, workplace democracy controls the internal wage market; whilst 
the market controls general level of wages) (Davidson 2012; Ridley-Duffy 
2010).  Community contributions (compulsory for cooperatives under Spanish 
law) are also democratically determined.  The remainder of business profits are 
set aside for repairs, capital purchases, health care, pensions, emergencies, and 
non-member salaries (Davidson 2012).  A relevant point is that co-op members 
are not workers, but associated producers, who vote their managers in and (if 
needed) out.  Nevertheless, those voted out of managerial roles do not have to 
leave; they merely return to non-management roles.  This point relates to the 
fact that MCC worker-owners cannot be fired, (although employees of MCC 
private companies as well as MCC trial members can be fired) (Davidson 2012). 
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Of further significance is that MCC has long been a successful exporter (since 
the mid-1970s) (Whyte 1999) which is remarkable considering that MCC 
competes against neoliberal multinationals less concerned by negative socio-
environmental externalities.  These externalities effectively provide a subsidy 
and a competitive advantage to many of MCC’s competitors (Bowman & Stone 
2004).  Bowman & Stone (2004) and Alperovitz (2014) have also reasoned that 
localised cooperatives, like MCC, are less likely to pollute the localities in which 
their worker-owners and families live, than would neoliberal corporations with 
geographically far removed share-holders and controllers.  Nonetheless, MCC’s 
commitment to ethical human and natural resource use, has meant that its 
cooperatives have had to focus on both innovation and human development to 
out compete their global technocratic competitors (Davidson 2012; Forcadell 
2005; Geoghegan 2017; Ridley-Duff 2010).  An important outcome of this has 
been MCC’s noteworthy and skilled leadership, in an organisation where the 
largest pay-differential between executives and workers is a mere five to one 
(Geoghegan 2017, p. 24).  Not surprisingly, with smaller management 
remunerations, MCC’s workers enjoy above average wages, as well as higher 
than average levels of work satisfaction, and negligible worker turnover 
(Davidson 2012).  The consistent growth of the cooperatives has also meant 
higher dividends and levels of financial capital for workers (Davidson 2012; 
Matthews 2003, 2008 [A]).  And of further note has been MCC’s ability to either 
maintain parity with, or surpass, current capitalist managerial, technological, 
and organisational efficiencies (Forcadell 2005; Geoghegan 2017; Davidson 
2012; Matthews 2008, 2012). 
MCC context and philosophy 
The first Mondragon cooperative was started in 1956 by a distributist Catholic 
priest, Father Don Jose Arizmendiarreta (or Fr Arizmendi) in the town of 
Mondragon in the Basque region of Spain.  MCC was started in response to the 
continuing poverty in the Basque region after the complex Spanish Civil War 
(Geoghegan 2017; Mathews 2003, 2008 [A]).  Amidst this ensuing regional 
economic depression, Fr Arizmendi used Catholic Social Teaching and 
distributist principles to start a community credit union, and connected 
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cooperative stove factory and polytechnic school (Davidson 2012; Geoghegan 
2017; Mathews 2008 [A]).  The credit union provided the start-up funding for 
the polytechnic school and later stove factory, whereupon the polytechnic 
school provided the needed expertise for the stove factory, and the successful 
stove factory provided jobs and, by extension, wealth for the community.  Thus, 
at MCC’s inception, Fr Arizmendi established the three-tier strategy that formed 
the basis of MCC’s consistent growth: (1) ensure education and development of 
worker-owners so as to facilitate their dynamic participation within democratic 
cooperatives; (2) ensure that projects are self-financed so as to maintain 
independence from coercive liberal capital flows and finance chains; (3) ensure 
both cooperative development and efficient production of high quality, in-
demand products (Davidson 2012; Mathews 2003).  This paper will also 
theorise that these processes, in part, help manifest distributist principles of 
the person (worker development and participatory cooperation), subsidiarity 
(worker control of management processes), the good life (capital ownership, 
employment security, and freedom from coercive liberal capital chains), the 
common good (community member capture of business profits and the 
presence of localised, “green”, stable industry), and authority (democratic, 
labour derived authority rather than authority derived from powerful capital 
owners and remote shareholders).  
Moreover, as “hard-nosed” and business savvy as the worker-owners of MCC 
have been, MCC has always been an ideological project (Davidson 2012; 
Geoghegan 2017; Ridley-Duff 2010; Schwartz 2009).  This fact partly stems 
from Fr Arizmendi’s initial influence.  For Fr Arizmendi, the establishment of 
the Mondragon cooperatives was part of a broad project to restore religious 
and social order in the economically depressed Basque region (Geoghegan 
2017). This point appears to be consistently omitted by both secular and 
academic MCC commentators (for example, Alperovitz [2013]).  Whether this is 
due to MCC’s Catholic origins which may play awkwardly within secular 
academia, or an unawareness of the fact, or it is of no interest to most 
commentators, is not within the remit of this paper to decide.  Nevertheless, Fr 
Arizmendi saw his primary role as making church and distributist teachings 
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“real”, and part of that role was to help establish work environments in which 
human dignity and solidarity could flourish (MCC’s motto is “Humanity at 
Work”) (Geoghegan 2017; Mathews 2003, 2008 [A]).  Fr Arizmendi also ‘sought 
to form “co-operators” rather than “co-operatives”, although the latter was an 
inevitable result of the former’ (Geoghegan 2017, p. 24). 
According to Davidson, however, (2012, p. 232 - 233), Fr Arizmendi’s ‘most 
important intellectual contribution to MCC… was the formulation of… ten 
governing principles, which are firmly held and practiced throughout’ MCC.  
These are:  
(1) That admission into the co-ops should be open and non-discriminatory  
(2) That one-worker-one vote participatory democracy should be the norm 
throughout the organisation 
(3) That labour has both sovereignty and primacy over capital, both within 
the organisation and in the adjacent communities (perhaps the core 
precept of distributism - that labour should own and hire capital and not 
the reverse)  
(4) That capital is only an instrument to be used for first-order, 
democratically decided goals 
(5) That all workers should be supported and trained so they can exercise self-
management 
(6) That pay solidarity should exist throughout the organisation, with pay 
differentials decided democratically 
(7) That otherwise autonomous cooperatives need to integrate with, and 
conform to, democratically decided network wide strategies and goals 
(8) That cooperative social transformations of neighbouring communities 
should take place to help foster economic stabilisation and localisation 
(9) That solidarity be given to the entire labour movement 
(10) And that worker education, empowerment, and knowledge sharing 
be consistently fostered (Davidson 2012) 
Implicit within Fr Arizmendi’s list is that persons are not isolated, individuated 
beings or technocratic process “inputs”; and instead are persons linked to 
shared values, norms, and goals.  Similarly, the list asserts that cooperation, 
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rather than neoliberal competition, should form the basis of an organisation 
and, if possible, the local political-economy.  The list also implicitly dismisses 
the liberal arguments for the “rights and freedoms” of capital, which historically 
have been shown to either conceal or justify often self-serving and exploitive 
actions by powerful capital owners.  And by placing labour and democratically 
determined goals at centre, the list implicitly refutes the liberal first-order 
claims for both market centrality and neutrality (Ridley-Duff 2010; Tam 1999).  
Within the list there is also an implicit emphasis upon responsibility (towards 
other workers, democratic processes, and the community), which is thought 
essential to the success of cooperative processes (Etzioni 1995).  In summary, 
within Arizmendi’ list it would appear that the anthropocentric requirements 
for comradeship, cooperation, solidarity, social rather than contractual 
relationships, significant control within one’s workplace and over one’s capital 
reserves, and responsibility towards others (Geoghegan 2017; Mathews, 2003, 
2008 [A]; Ridley-Duff 2010) all appear central to MCC.  These workplace 
methods differ considerably from de Saint-Simon’s technocratic model, with its 
insistence upon meritocratic, command-and-control management, and its 
requirements for worker passivity.  Furthermore, it would appear that by using 
its cooperative, democratic, and person-centred model, MCC has been able to 
out compete many of its globalised technocratic rivals (for example, see Irizar 
section) (Forcadell 2005).  And such results perhaps put into question the 
normalcy of globalised-neoliberal-technocratic systems.   
An effective sign of MCC’s commitment to cooperative and democratic 
processes has been its training of elected managers and leaders.  Whilst 
coaching in communication, leadership, and decision-making skills are 
widespread throughout MCC, it is important to note that MCC only provides 
specific management training after worker-owners have been elected to their 
posts.  The rationale for this is twofold: firstly, the policy seeks to prevent 
situations whereby only those who have undergone requisite training can run 
for elections, and this opens candidate processes to all worker-owners; and 
secondly, it seeks to prevent an elite, managerial “acculturation” process 
occurring whereby course requirements are used by managerial elites to vet 
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candidates.  In contrast, all MCC worker-owners are encouraged to apply for 
leadership roles, and time spent in such roles is viewed as part of the 
responsibility and duty of all worker-owners (Ridley-Duff 2010).  Regarding 
these points, below is an example of a MCC sub-co-op which took to worker 
management in a sweeping manner.  
MCC sub-cooperative example – Irizar 
The MCC sub-co-op, Irizar, is noteworthy for its sales successes, recognised 
quality of products, environmental standards, management capabilities, and its 
deep levels of participatory, egalitarian democratic processes.  Irizar’s business 
is chiefly the assemblage of luxury coaches from components sourced from 
both MCC co-ops and its global businesses.  Over the decades it has garnered a 
crowd of awards (e.g.  Guipuzcoa Award for Best Company of the year 2017, 
Irizar i6S coach 2017 Coach of the Year [Spain], National Business Award for the 
Environment Spain 2016, Coach of the Year Award 1994 [UK], Gold Worldwide 
Transport Award 1998 [coaches], Coach of the Year 2004 [Europe], European 
Quality Prize 2000, & Economist Intelligence Unit most efficient coach builder in 
the world 2000) (Irizar 2017; Forcadell 2005).  Irizar started in 1889 and was 
incorporated into the Mondragon federation in 1962 (it had become a co-op in 
1956).  It’s long-standing global competitiveness partly stems from its 
innovative and flexible knowledge management and manufacturing systems.  
This combination has allowed the co-op to more easily adapt to multiple global 
market requirements, as well as to diverse national and regional safety 
regulations (Forcadell 2005).   
Nevertheless, Irizar, in effect, went bankrupt in 1991, and had it been a 
capitalist organisation it would have ceased operations in that year (or as early 
as 1980).  However, MCC stayed true to its “better to die than to close” maxim, 
and allowed Irizar to restructure in 1991 and provided funding to help 
accomplish this.  As part of that transition, Irizar made its sales focus the global 
markets and made luxury coaches their sole product (they had also previously 
built urban public transport busses).  However, it was Irizar’s organisational 
restructuring that was most profound.  Members formulated and agreed upon 
an organisational system with almost no hierarchy, in which members 
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subscribed to shared values and objectives, and in which all worker-owners 
took responsibility to help direct, coordinate, communicate, innovate, and lead 
where needed.  Whilst the new level of responsibility for worker-owners was 
unprecedented, so too were the new levels of shared, egalitarian, revivifying, 
creative, and empowering work experiences (Forcadell 2005).  
Decision power was mostly devolved to 180 mostly autonomous shop-floor 
teams, and there was a concomitant development of worker leadership, 
knowledge translation, cooperation, and technical skills.  Apart from having to 
both design and execute the most efficient task sets to produce the best 
possible required item or service, these work-place teams also had to 
coordinate their functions with other co-op divisions, product suppliers, and 
customers.  A salient point is that it was not just production requirements that 
were collectively set by the shop-floor teams, but also marketing directions, 
work targets, and decisions on what to produce; roles traditionally reserved 
within capitalist-technocratic firms for elite management (Bowman & Stone 
2004; Forcadell 2005).  And according to Forcadell (2005), what held these 
multitudinous, non-centralised, highly dynamic units tightly and efficiently 
together were shared vision, raised levels of social (not neoliberal-contractual) 
trust, shared experience, effective knowledge flows, shared learning, broad 
empowerment, enthusiastic participation, and a tolerance of mistakes.   
 Worker enthusiasm for the Irizar project can be measured by the fact that over 
20% of worker-owners have been leaders at some stage, and that the Annual 
General Meetings routinely attract 100% attendance.  It should be noted that 
there is no financial reward for attending such meetings.  And for a substantial 
global manufacturer, the pay scales at Irizar are remarkably flat, with a 3 to 1 
ratio between top management and worker incomes (Forcadell 2005).  In total, 
Irizar’s decentralised, “bottom-up” restructuring appears to be a profound 
overall example of the distributist concept of subsidiarity, whereby those most 
affected by decisions have a key say in them (Cornish 2017).  Irizar’s success is 
also perhaps a substantial challenge to the neoliberal “top-down” management 
model, whereby technocratic systems’ needs are given powerful priority over 
worker needs for participatory dynamism (Robbins 2011)  
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An important sign of Irizar’s success, and by extension the MCC model, was that 
from 2014 Irizar had returned to making urban transit busses, many of which 
are now used on public transport routes in European cities.  Irizar has also 
developed a network of global factories, including plants in Brazil, Mexico, 
Morocco, and South Africa (Irizar Group 2017).  Nevertheless, such global 
growth within the MCC network has generated both external and internal 
criticisms. 
MCC critiques and counter-critiques 
This paper will argue that critics of MCC have focused mostly upon two issues: 
firstly, that the overall organisation has not been immune to technocratic 
processes and, secondly, that there are inequalities between worker-owners 
and MCC private company employees.  There also appears to be an academic 
consensus that these issues stemmed from MCC’s attempts to survive economic 
globalisation (Bowman & Sone 2004; Kasmir 1996, 1999).  Although MCC 
survived and even managed to grow through Spain’s 1982 and 1989 recessions, 
as well as through Spain’s 1986 entry into the European Union and its later 
integration into the global economy, it was not without cost to MCC’s founding 
principles.  From the mid-1980’s and through the 1990’s, Mondragon began to 
mimic its corporate rivals by centralising decision making as well as using non-
member, non-voting labour (Bowman & Stone 2004, Kasmir 1996, 1999; Whyte 
1999).  Kasmir (1996 & 1999) and Bowman & Stone (2004) have argued that 
this non-member labour was frequently used in a capitalistic and exploitative 
manner, relative to other MCC members.  However, MCC members were not 
immune from technocratic exploitation either, with MCC governing council 
members increasingly ignoring their social councils’ advice on work conditions.  
The result was frequent introductions of stressful, capitalist factory production 
methods for MCC members, whilst management conditions appeared to remain 
true to MCC’s pro-social ethos.    Not surprisingly, through the 1990’s factory 
worker alienation and contempt towards management became widespread, 
and many workers feared that Mondragon would degrade into a market based, 
technocratic corporation (Bowman & Stone 2004; Kasmir 1999). 
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However, Kasmir (1996; 1999) took her critique further.  She argued that 
Mondragon became a postmodern manifestation of capitalism, whose 
cooperative, democratic processes were managerially dominated and mostly 
pro forma.  As a result, MCC’s drift towards neoliberal technocracy was argued 
to be inevitable. The argument continued (somewhat contradictorily 
considering the previous point) that the MCC model was indigenous to the 
Basque region of Spain and strongly reflected that region’s unique cooperative 
traditions.  Therefore, it could not be easily replicated elsewhere, despite claims 
to the contrary by optimistic cooperativists.  However, the main point of 
contention for Kasmir (1996, 1999), appeared to be MCC’s implicit anti-
unionism, and that its claims to working-class solidarities were thin (Kasmir & 
Wilson 1999).   
MCC’s defenders responded that the core democratic structures of MCC 
survived the initial decades of globalisation, and provided members powerful 
means to reclaim the organisation’s original intent (Bowman & Stone 2004), 
and that this appears to have significantly happened since 2000 (Davidson 
2012; Geoghegan 2017; Ridley-Duff 2010; Forcadell 2005).  This report would 
further argue that the example of the Irizar sub-co-op group (see previous 
section) seems to strongly contradict Kasmir’s (1999) normative assertions 
that MCC had developed into a technocracy; especially since much of Irizar’s 
egalitarian, empowering, and deep democratisations occurred during the time 
Kasmir was conducting her analyses (Forcadell 2005).  Moreover, whatever 
criticisms Kasmir’s (1999) participants had of MCC, nobody she interviewed 
appeared to want to leave to go work for a capitalist firm (Davidson 2012).  
Kasmir’s (1996, 1999) analyses also appeared to align with others (Davidson 
2012; Matthews 2007, 2012), in that MCC had proven itself a community 
stabilising and wealth producing force for the Basque region no matter how 
dire the rest of the Spanish economy (Davidson 2012).  Similarly, and 
significantly, at no stage did the MCC workforce consider selling out to 
investors to become a standard corporation (Bowman & Stone 2004; Davidson 
2012).  And even during the stressful transitional period of the 1990’s, MCC still 
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attained, on average, superior results over corporate rivals over all levels of 
organisational assessment (especially lifespan) (Bowman & Stone 2004). 
It would also appear that MCC sits uneasily within Kasmir’s (1999) ostensibly 
Marxist analysis.  For example, her disapproval of MCC worker-owners who 
resist trade-union militancy.  Kasmir’s (1996, 1999) appears to view MCC 
workers-owners as workers, who have essentially the same interests and 
affinities as capitalist workers.  However, according to Davidson (2012) such an 
analysis is inappropriate.  Co-op worker-owners are not wage labour but 
associated small producers.  This means that they do not have external owners 
alien to the production processes; rather, they have democratically elected 
worker representatives that sit on both governing and social councils. Thus, 
when capitalist workers go on strike (or on sympathy strike with others) they 
place pressure upon external managers and capital owners; however, when 
MCC workers go on strike they only subtract from their own material interests.  
Counter wise, if MCC workers vote to work longer hours, it is to their own 
benefit, and not to the benefit of external owners (Davidson 2012).  The latter 
point is significant, since according to Davidson (2012), Kasmir (1996) 
criticizes the often-long hours that MCC workers democratically elect to do.  
Nevertheless, Kasmir (1996, 1999) is perhaps correct to argue that the level of 
solidarity given by most MCC worker-owners does not match Fr Arizmendi’s 
goal for universal solidarity with the labour movement; but does that solidarity 
require MCC worker-owners to join sympathy strikes with fellow Spanish 
workers?  This paper would offer that such actions are easier to suggest than to 
enact. 
As mentioned above, Kasmir (1996 ,1999) also argued that Mondragon’s 
participatory processes were mostly pro forma, effectively making MCC a veiled 
technocracy.  However, it is difficult to reconcile Kasmir’s (1996, 1999) bleak 
assessment with the one hundred percent attendance rate at the non-
compulsory, unpaid Irizar annual general meetings, as well as Irizar’s radically 
democratic and egalitarian governance structure (Forcadell 2005).   Moreover, 
Davidson (2012) and Ridley-Duff (2010) have argued that even worker-owners 
who are often apathetic or even cynical towards MCC’s democratic processes 
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still view them as participatory or at least superior to neoliberal alternatives.  
Ridley-Duff (2010) further argued that MCC’s democratic processes do in fact 
prevent management from dominating work processes, and that worker-
owners do exercise means to prevent their exploitation.  And evidence of MCC’s 
participatory and cooperative ethos can arguably be seen in its culture of 
innovation, its higher than average wages for workers, its egalitarian wage 
distributions, its worker development programmes, its small management 
requirements, its quality control procedures, its unrivalled worker 
productivity, and it’s renowned professionally serious but relaxed work ethic 
(Davidson 2012; Forcadell 2005). 
With regards to both MCC’s use of non-member labour and ownership of 
overseas limited liability corporations, MCC’s defenders argue that Kasmir’s 
(1996, 1999) broad-brush claims of exploitation are not accurate.  Firstly, the 
core cooperative societies still form the vast bulk of the MCC businesses 
(Geoghegan 2017).  Secondly, MCC has reasoned that to “cooperativize” many 
of its private companies would not work since many of the companies’ 
respective countries do not have legislation to enable (or even allow) 
cooperatives.  Similarly, MCC has argued that even within countries with 
cooperatives’ legislation, it is often too expensive and challenging to start 
cooperatives; thus, making company buy-outs a logical option for global growth 
(Forcadell 2005; Whyte 1999).  Forcadell (2005) also noted, that MCC 
executives have reasoned that not all cultures have cooperative traditions and 
values, and that it would be inappropriate to impose them.  Nevertheless, 
according to Forcadell (2005), MCC’s Distribution Group has introduced 
democratic mechanisms into its overseas limited liability companies, and 
demonstrated that it is possible to treat non-member employees at least 
similarly to members (Forcadell 2005).  Moreover, where “cooperativisation” 
has been possible, MCC has been swift to enact it.  A successful 1990’s example 
of this (which Kasmir [1999] failed to include in her critical analyses) was 
MCC’s purchase of the struggling supermarket chain Eroski.  Employee 
ownership-share purchases were soon offered to its employees with no trial 
periods, along with interest-free, five-year loans for those unable to purchase 
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shares upfront.  Within two months 74% of employees had taken up the offer, 
and Eroski went on to become the fastest growing consumer cooperative in 
Spain (Whyte 1999).  Thus, whilst worker-owner and employee alienation had 
occurred at MCC during its transitional 1990’s period, it appears erroneous to 
argue that such alienation was normative; similarly, to argue that MCC’s 
business buy-outs were as exploitive as those of capitalist multinationals 
appears unsubstantiated (Forcadell 2005; Whyte 1999).  
However, from a distributists viewpoint (such as Chesterton’s [1910]) perhaps 
the most problematical aspect of Kasmir’s (1999) analysis was that at no point 
did she provide an outline of a political-economy that she would like, and 
thereby did not explicate the ideal (or merely preferred) political-economy 
model from which her critique is implicitly drawn.  For distributist thinkers 
such as Chesterton (1908), this is not only obscurantist, but an academic 
power-play, which grants the analyst power of judgement but with 
considerable protection from scrutiny.  Nevertheless, whatever Kasmir’s 
(1999) preferred model, as per Davidson’s (2012) critique, it would most likely 
include broad-based militant trade-unionism, along with strong socialist 
parties derived from union organising.  However, according to political-
economists such as Wolff (2012) and Alperovitz (2013), the return of 
widespread, politically powerful, militant trade-unions to the West is unlikely.  
In addition, distributist and other cooperativist theorists argue that trade union 
militancy is unlikely to address the structural issues of concentrated capital 
ownership (Alperovitz 2013; Blond 2009). 
In summary, both critics and supporters of MCC would probably concur that 
the truer sub-cooperatives remain to their first-order principles, the better they 
do when measured against a broad range of criteria including social, economic, 
and environmental outcomes (Bowman & Stone 2004; Forcadell 2005; Ridley-
Duff 2010).  An example of this is the profound success of the sub-cooperative 
Irizar, which took to person-centred, democratic, cooperative, empowering, 
subsidiary processes in a radical manner.  And these processes have helped 
Irizar produce globally in-demand, high quality, technologically sophisticated, 
environmentally sensitive products and manufacturing processes (Forcadell 
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2005; Irizar Group 2017).  Similarly, both MCC’s critics and supporters would 
most probably concur that MCC helped to facilitate one of the most socio-
economically cooperative and self-managed regions in the world - the city of 
Mondragon - with its unparalleled community structures and organisations.  
This cooperation and subsidiary type self-management extends to the 
promotion of responsible consumption, local culture, civic education, and 
migrant integration (Azkarraga-Etxagibel et al 2012).  Nevertheless, the 
foremost obstacle to the spread of models such as MCC, appears not to be 
outside competition, but a lack of global cooperative networks.  The result is 
that even a large cooperative “island” like MCC struggles to remain true to its 
pro-social, distributist ideals within a capitalist ocean (Bowman & Stone 2004, 
p. 278).  Thus, for theorists such as Wolff (2012), Alperovitz (2013), Matthews 
(1999, 2003, 2007), and Bowman & Stone (2004), the goal for cooperativists 
and distributists is to increasingly replace coercive neoliberal trade networks 
with voluntary cooperative networks.  And it was both the MCC model and the 
“replace and displace” theory that influenced a derivative of MCC, and by 
extension distributism, The Cleveland Model (Alperovitz, Howard & Williamson 
2010). 
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8. What is The Cleveland Model (TCM)? 
 
The non-profit institutions which helped form The Cleveland Model (TCM) in 
the American city of Cleveland, Ohio, were directly inspired and influenced by 
the success of MCC (Schwartz 2009).  They adapted MCC’s distributive 
principles to the context of Cleveland (see below), and developed a new 
cooperative political-economy model whereby industrial-sized, worker owned, 
and community benefitting cooperatives and enterprises provided goods and 
services to nearby “anchor institutions” (Alperovitz 2013; Howard & 
Williamson 2010; Schwartz 2009).  The term “anchor institutions” refers to 
large, prestigious, asset and income rich urban organisations tied to their 
respective localities.  These stand in contrast to large private corporations 
which can opportunistically move headquarters or “hive off” production to 
global contractors.  Examples of anchor institutions include universities, 
hospitals, technical colleges, public utilities, council chambers, large sporting 
facilities, large religious organisations, and large galleries and cultural 
institutions (Wright, Hexter & Downer 2016).  Although a hybrid model, TCM 
still follows the basic structures of MCC, with autonomous sub-cooperatives 
being coordinated, financed, and integrated through an overarching 
cooperative body, which in Cleveland’s case is The Evergreen Cooperative 
(Alperovitz 2013; Schwartz 2009). 
TCM’s political-economy context 
Cleveland is one of the clearest urban casualties of globalisation, and one of the 
first Western cities to find itself on the losing side of the 1980’s neoliberal 
revolution.  Previously, Cleveland had benefitted from the growth of large, 
technocratically run corporations and especially those focused on heavy 
industry and manufacturing.  In fact, up until the 1970’s, Cleveland had been an 
important producer of iron, steel, steel products, machine tools, construction 
equipment, petrochemicals, auto-parts, and electrical machinery.  And as a 
pivotal centre of U.S industrial interests, it was especially tied to the roles that 
publicly traded corporations played in America (Stapleton 2017). 
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From 1910 onwards, corporations in the U.S began to acquire roles performed 
mostly by the state in other Western nations.  This fact can be traced to Teddy 
Roosevelt’s 1910 “New Nationalism” speech, where The President stated that 
the centralising, oligopolistic propensities of technocratic capitalism were 
unstoppable, and that it was best to try and harness these propensities for the 
public good, rather than combat them.  This speech set the U.S. progressive 
political-economy agenda for decades, and resulted in U.S corporations taking 
on four distinct roles: the production of goods and services; the provision of 
stable employment; the provision of social welfare through health insurance 
and pension plans; and the provision of safe locations for investments, 
especially those related to retirement plans (Davis 2013).  Indeed, the 
corporate roles of medical and retirement providers were uniquely prominent 
in the U.S. (Davis 2013; Irwin 2017).  Moreover, during the 20th Century the 
corporation in the U.S. became a sine qua non for the market economy (Davis 
2013); which it is not, especially when considering Germany’s robust, export 
orientated economy which has relatively fewer corporations and far more mid-
sized, family own businesses (the “Mittelstand” system) (Bulkeley 2011; Davis 
2013).  Nevertheless, through corporate funded social services, good wages, 
and stable promotion opportunities, communities were at least partially able to 
capture the wealth generated by the organisational behemoths in their midst.  
However, this fact also made American working-class communities expressly 
vulnerable to disturbances within the broader, global corporate culture (Davis 
2013; Irwin 2017). 
Such disturbances were manifested by the neoliberal “share-holder values’” 
movement (Davis 2013), along with new abilities to offshore production (Coe et 
al 2007; Harvey 1990; Leyshon 1995).  The first was enabled by changes to U.S. 
legislation during the 1980’s which allowed leviathan sized corporations to be 
subjected to “hostile” takeovers, whereupon the target corporations were 
usually asset stripped, divided, and sold off.  ‘Those corporations that remained 
often voluntarily restructured, selling off or closing peripheral businesses to 
focus on a core set of industries’ (Davis 2013, p. 287). These processes alone 
closed innumerable centres of production.  This “share-holder” movement also 
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made investments in corporations, ironically, more volatile.  In fact, Davis 
(2013) has estimated that between 2000 and 2012 a person’s retirement 
savings would have been better invested in credit-union savings accounts, 
instead of diversified mutual funds.  And yet most U.S retirement funds were 
invested in diversified corporate stocks/mutual funds.  A further irony was that 
shareholder capitalism lead to an unprecedented loss of control over 
investment monies for all except the most powerful shareholders.  Investment 
institutions (such as BlackRock) garnered unprecedented control over 
investors’ monies, and new-economy corporations (such as Google and 
Facebook) created super-voting rights for their business founders, with some 
corporate founders claiming up to 150 votes per share in perpetuity.  This 
combination helped render most investors passive and disinterested (Davis 
2013).  With regards to Offshoring, dozens of large companies turned to generic 
manufacturers, distributors, and information systems’ providers, mostly in 
China and India, to perform what were once core corporate functions.  The 
corporate roles that remained were often contractual, and mostly managerial, 
design, and brand management related.  In addition, the colossal global 
expansion of generic producers and distributors allowed enterprises to both 
rapidly scale up and scale down production, depending upon volatile market 
demand and rapid technological change.  Not surprisingly, stable, long-term 
corporate employment within such an economy, especially for working class 
persons, became mostly obsolete (Coe et al 2007; Davis 2013; Irwin 2017; 
Leyshon 1995; MacKinnon & Cumbers 2007) 
The before mentioned has led journalists such as Irwin (2017), and political-
economists such as Davis (2013) and Alperovitz (2013) to argue that the 
corporation in the U.S. is now unsuitable to play its traditional roles of stable 
employer, provider of social welfare, and investment space for long-term, 
reliable retirement returns.  Its core roles now appear to be providers of 
consumer goods and services, and generators of wealth and power for 
corporate owners and controllers (Alperovitz 2013; Davis 2013).  The socio-
economic ramifications of this transition could be argued as threefold: 
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(1) That relatively stable, well-paying, entry level corporate jobs with 
prospects for promotion have been mostly superseded by casual, 
contractual, and self-employed work (the “gig” economy) with little 
opportunity for promotion (Alperovitz 2013; Davis 2013; Irwin 2017; 
The Economist 2015, p. 7).  In fact, American studies have shown that 
working class male entrants into the new-economy of the 1990’s were 
more likely to remain caught in precarious entry level jobs than their 
predecessors in the 1960’s and 1970’s (Bernhardt, Morris, Handcock & 
Scott 1999).  However, it is not only working-class applicants whose 
prospects narrowed, with many computer science and engineering 
graduates discovering that their skills within a globalised workforce 
were neither as rare or remunerative as they thought (Davis 2013, p. 
295; Irwin 2017).   
(2) That U.S. government social security and health care systems were 
partially built around the assumption that corporations would help 
provide such services, and this fact helped create a relative paucity of 
U.S. government social services compared to analogous nations.  Thus, 
the corporate flight from communities (such as Cleveland) together with 
a new self-focused corporate culture created not only economic 
vulnerabilities, but also deep gaps in social and health care services 
(Davis 2013; Irwin 2017).  
(3) That disappearing corporate pension plans, combined with modest state 
provisions for the elderly, and a working population with over half their 
retirements savings invested in unstable mutual funds, generated 
retirement anxieties and insecurities for working class persons.  In 
addition, such investors had next to no influence on the companies in 
which they were invested (Davis 2013; Alperovitz & Dubb 2012). 
These changes to American corporate culture were, in part, a stimulus for 
groups like The Democracy Collaborative (part founders of TCM) to look 
towards MCC for alternatives (Workplace Democracy 2014; Schwartz 2009).  
These groups determined that any political-economy alternative would need to 
provide means for nearby communities to capture some of the wealth 
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generated by the large businesses and organisations in their midst, but on a 
deeper scale than was done previously (Wright, Hexter & Downer 2017).   
Similarly, new businesses would need to offer long-term, stable working-class 
jobs with living wages, along with good prospects for promotions and 
professional development (Alperovitz 2013; Dubb & Howard 2012).  
Businesses would further need to be safe spaces for workers to invest money, 
and where workers’ voices were not superfluous.  And the new political-
economy model would need to have businesses tied to their locality and 
community, and make sure that they employed and developed local citizens, as 
well as use local small businesses and contractors (Alperovitz, Howard & 
Williamson 2010; Dubb & Howard 2012; Howard 2012).  TCM further 
incorporated into its mandate that these objectives should be done in some of 
the United States’ poorest neighbourhoods, using the most sustainable and 
cutting-edge work and production methods, and offer empirically superior 
products and services along with competitive long-term contracts (Alperovitz & 
Dubb 2012; Howard 2012; The Democracy Collaborative 2016; Wright et al 
2017).  And this report will argue that the Evergreen Cooperatives in Cleveland, 
a direct manifestation of TCM, were able to achieve these goals. 
 
TCM and The Evergreen Cooperatives 
Although once a prosperous and important city, by the time the GFC began in 
2007, Cleveland was already experiencing poverty rates of nearly 30% along 
with localities of social destitution and long-term unemployment.  
Nevertheless, groups such as The Democracy Collaborative noted that through 
Cleveland’s long socio-economic decline, many of its anchor institutions 
remained and thrived (Alperovitz 2013; Howard 2012).  Cleveland’s powerful 
institutional presence was mostly due to its industrial past and the related 
requirements for industrial research and development (Stapleton 2017).  A 
salient point is that whilst production centres became easily transportable 
through the processes of globalisation, advanced research and development 
infrastructures often remained locality bound (Coe et al 2007; Harvey 1990, 
Leyshon 1995; MacKinnon & Cumbers 2007).  In fact, Cleveland’s research 
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capabilities continued to grow through its economic decline, and added medical 
science and technology to its list (Stapleton 2017).  These same research and 
education institutions, however, were mostly surrounded by poor and blighted 
neighbourhoods, with the latter benefitting little from the wealthy 
organisational behemoths in their midst (Alperovitz 2013; Wright et al 2017).  
Not surprisingly, there was little contact between the respective institutions 
and their fellow residents.  And institution work contracts mostly went to 
globalised firms whose workers, shareholders, and head-offices were 
geographically far removed. The instigators of TCM noted these issues 
(Alperovitz 2013; Dubb & Howard 2012), and determined that if local 
cooperatives could supply goods and services to neighbouring institutions, 
local communities could begin to capture some of the wealth generated by 
these institutions.  What is more, local communities would begin to experience 
not only the multiplier effects of stable local employment, but also the social 
benefits of the cooperative and democratic traditions instilled within local 
worker-owners (Alperovitz & Dubb 2012; Alperovitz, Howard & Williamson 
2010; Howard 2012).  The respective institutions would also benefit through 
more meaningful connection with their locality (Wright et al 2017). 
The vehicle used to enact TCM was The Evergreen Cooperative Initiatives that 
began in 2007.  Rather than trickle-down economics, according to Howard 
(2012), Evergreen focused upon: 
‘… economic inclusion and (on) building a local economy from the ground up.  
Rather than offering public subsidy to induce corporations to bring what are 
often low-wage jobs… the Evergreen strategy is catalysing new businesses that 
are owned by their employees.  And rather than… (train residents) for jobs that 
are largely unavailable to low-skilled and low-income workers, the Evergreen 
Initiative first creates the jobs and then recruits and trains local residents to take 
them’ (p. 210) 
Moreover, Evergreen’s focus was for its employees to build both capital 
reserves and wage derived wealth through cooperative ownership 
mechanisms, which would in turn help strengthen and stabilise their 
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communities through the multiplier effects of spending, as well as through the 
pro-social influence of newly empowered residents (Howard 2012). 
Nevertheless, the platform of TCM is leveraging off the resources and wealth 
contained within anchor institutions.  And in the case of Cleveland, its 
concentration of anchor institutions within the ‘Greater University Circle’ 
district, to which Evergreen Co-ops directly leverage off, is noteworthy.  In fact, 
participating TCM anchor institutions include The Cleveland Foundation (an 
important driver of TCM and a long established and powerful change agent 
within Cleveland), The Cleveland Clinic (a globally important medical teaching 
and research centre), University Hospitals, Case Western Reserve University, The 
City of Cleveland-Health Tech Corridor, Cleveland State University, and other 
smaller institutions besides (Wright et al 2016).  Such anchor institution 
concentrations may be atypical, and thus, may affect the applicability of TCM in 
other urban settings.  Nevertheless, advocates of TCM have seen possible 
applications for the model in American cities as diverse as Atlanta, Baltimore, 
Pittsburgh (Alperovitz, Howard & Williamson 2010), Denver, Rochester, and 
even Preston in the U.K. (Sheffield 2017)    
In Cleveland’s case, nonetheless, its prominent circle of institutions was, and is, 
surrounded by mostly lower socio-economic suburbs.  The usual American 
institutional responses to such social geography is either gentrification of the 
surrounding areas with rent-market driven removal of poor persons, or, an 
isolationist stance crafted by the institution in response to its locality (Wright, 
et al 2016).  In contrast, The Greater University Circle Initiative (a further 
component of the Evergreen initiative) sought to ‘reweave (and engage) 
community networks... (and) improve the quality of life in surrounding 
neighbourhoods, and to give residents a greater voice and connection to the 
resources of the anchor institutions’.  This could be summed up with the TCM 
slogan ‘Hire Local, Live Local, Buy Local, and Connect’ (Wright et al 2016, pp. 2 
– 3). 
This paper will briefly describe how four of the Evergreen sub-co-ops manifest 
these initiatives.  The first is the Evergreen Cooperative Laundry (ECL), which is 
arguably the “greenest” industrial sized laundry service in Ohio, and has been 
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growing steadily since its inception in 2007 (Alperovitz, Howard & Williamson 
2010; Dubb & Howard 2012).  Its initial market comprised of the multiple 
hospital related institutions within the Greater University Circle, but the co-op 
has also diversified to laundering the linen of hotels and nursing homes 
(Evergreen Cooperative Laundry 2017; Howard 2012).  The second is Ohio 
Cooperative Solar, one of the largest and most technologically advanced solar 
panel providers in the Mid-East of America, which also owns, operates, and 
maintains the vast solar panels of Cleveland State University and other anchor 
institutions besides.  That said, home solar panel provision is still a key part of 
the cooperative’s business (Alperovitz 2013; Dubb & Howard 2012; Evergreen 
Cooperatives 2017).  Thirdly, the Green City Growers’ cooperative is one of the 
largest urban food production greenhouses in the Unites States, and is located 
at the centre of one of Cleveland’s poorest localities.  Its cutting-edge 
production techniques provide fruits and vegetables to local institutions, 
restaurants, markets, and supermarkets (Trattner 2017; Evergreen 
Cooperatives 2017).  A salient point is that all three sub-cooperatives have 
consistently employed and incorporated into ownership persons who were: 
long-term unemployed, former prisoners with slight job prospects, as well as 
vulnerable refugees, migrants, and community members (Alperovitz 2013; 
Sheffield 2017; Trattner 2017; Evergreen Cooperatives 2011).  The fourth 
example is Evergreen Business Services which appears to have successfully 
provided concept-to-implementation services for TCM styled cooperative start-
ups, as well as back-office support and accounting services (Evergreen 
Cooperatives 2017).  When combined, these sub-co-ops arguably represent not 
only a notable, sustainable, and successful cooperative political-economy 
project, but a successful employment and community wealth producing project, 
and all within one of America’s poorest cities (Alperovitz 2013; Howard 2012). 
Nevertheless, that still leaves the former American corporate roles of social 
service providers, and safe space for financial investment to be filled.  
Evergreen Cooperatives appear to offer the standard array of corporate social 
service provisions as well as benefits such as credit management, mortgage 
assistance, bonuses, substantial business equity, and added savings bonuses for 
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retirement (Evergreen Cooperatives 2011; Howard 2012; Trattner 2017).  
Moreover, part of the Mondragon (MCC) project is the provision of cooperative, 
high-quality health care to its worker-owners (Davidson 2012; Geoghegan 
2017), and with the initial success of TCM it is plausible that the same could 
occur with TCM.  With regards to the provision of safe investment spaces, TCM 
has yet to develop a cooperative banking system like that of MCC; nevertheless, 
its investment spaces are already considerable.  Firstly, worker-owners have 
shares in their respective co-ops, and it has been estimated that within eight 
years ‘a typical Evergreen worker-owner could possess an equity stake in their 
company of about (U.S.) $65,000’ (Howard 2012).  It should be noted that in 
2009 the average annual median income in the surrounding suburbs of 
Cleveland’s University Circle was a mere (U.S) $18,500 (Alperovitz, Howard & 
Williamson 2010; Schwartz 2009).  Thus, such financial capital represents a 
considerable, stable capital asset, especially when considering that the 
Evergreen model is based around long-term contracts with wealthy and stable 
anchor institutions (Howard 2012).  Moreover ‘research from the (United 
States’ based) National Centre for Employee Ownership released in May 
(2017)’ showed ‘that employee owners have a household net worth that is 92% 
higher than non-employee owners’ (Kesler 2017, p. 1).  And, in addition, 
worker-owners would most likely have more say in the running of their 
business than would an investor in a managed fund (Alperovitz 2013; 
Evergreen Cooperatives 2011).  Persons could also invest into the Evergreen 
Cooperative Development Fund which invests only within existing Evergreen co-
ops and co-op start-ups.  The fund’s investors include philanthropic 
foundations, municipal and federal governments, banks, and universities.  
Moreover, each Evergreen co-op must place 10% of their pre-tax profits back 
into the fund to help expand and strengthen the Evergreen projects.  
Nevertheless, an investor’s expectation would need to conform to the 
development fund’s cooperative, pro-social, and poverty alleviation goals, and 
as such, an investor could not expect speculative, short-term, high returns 
(Evergreen Cooperatives 2017).  That said, as a form of steady and stable 
investment it appears safe and promising. 
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Concluding remarks on TCM 
This report would argue that TCM appears to respond well to the socio-
economic gaps left by the neoliberal abandonment of the traditional U.S roles 
for publicly traded corporations (Davis 2013).  For example, the Evergreen 
Cooperatives appear to address community needs for a provider of: stable, 
dignified employment; tailor made social services; stable capital ownership and 
control; and stable investment space for retirement.  TCM also speaks to 
distributist concepts relating to: 
 the person; by providing dignified, cooperative workspaces and often for those 
unable to “break into” the neoliberal job market; 
the common good; by helping build sustainable, egalitarian localised economies; 
the good life; by providing capital ownership and control to enable relative 
independence from state and global-market coercions; 
subsidiarity; by facilitating “bottom-up” and cooperative solutions to local 
economic needs; 
and authority; whereby local community needs for employment and wealth-
capture have priority over global capital needs. 
Moreover, TCM appears to allow communities to “capture the wealth” of nearby 
institutions in a more effective manner than either the Keynesian or globalised-
neoliberal models were able to (Alperovitz 2013).  This paper would further 
offer that this represents a practical and empowering case of distributed 
wealth, and that TCM’s anthropocentric (rather than technocratic) focus seems 
to have manifested in Cleveland a practical source of personal, familial, and 
community stability and well-being (Alperovitz 2013; Howard 2012).    
Potential issues arising from TCM implementations 
Ironically, it is the potential for success with TCM that leads to many of its 
criticisms.  For instance, a successful manifestation of TCM could cause 
gentrification processes, such as rent increases.  Meaning, that businesses and 
upwardly mobile residents might move to TCM areas to take advantage of the 
new dynamism and initially low rents; which then might generate rent 
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increases.  Such dynamics would need to be counteracted by anchor 
institutions and local governments through rental assistance, inclusionary 
zoning, and assisted housing.  These policies might better allow poor persons - 
the ones meant to benefit most from TCM – to remain in their neighbourhoods 
(Dubb & Howard 2012). 
 
Another challenge is ensuring that anchor-based co-ops create jobs that low-
skilled workers can be “trained-up” for.  An obverse arrangement would mean 
that skilled workers would need to be brought in from outside of the local 
community, and such hiring practices might then exacerbate income and social 
divides. This in turn could accelerate gentrification and even generate local 
resentments towards the (albeit well-meaning) participating anchor 
institutions.  A means to avoid this might be creating businesses that require 
numerous entry level positions (such as industrial laundries) as happened with 
the Evergreen Cooperatives in Cleveland (Dubb & Howard 2012). 
 
Other issues include defining exactly what is the community being targeted; for 
example, is the community purely locality based, or socio-economically based?  
Similar challenges relate to defining “first order” priorities; for instance, why 
exactly is the institution engaging in the TCM process?  Is it economic and 
social-geographic inclusion?  Or to create opportunities for poorer persons?  Or 
to reduce carbon emissions?  Or a belief in distributive-cooperative concepts?  
Or a belief in localism and community engagement?  These first-order 
questions are important, since they will most likely affect how targeted 
community members and institutions construct policies and programs together 
(Dubb & Howard 2012; Harkavy et al 2009). 
 
Other challenges would include making sure that targeted groups are involved 
with the setting of both cooperative network goals and means of assessment 
(Harkavy et al 2009).  The obverse would be having such goals and means of 
assessment set by the anchor institutions and paternalistic/maternalistic 
cooperative bodies, and then trying to find communities to comply with them 
(Dubb & Howard 2012).  Such a dynamic could be especially contrary to 
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distributist principles, since these emphasise that cooperative economies are 
only valid if they are done with person, and not done to persons (Chesterton 
1927). 
 
Importantly, the cooperative relationships would need to be institutionalized 
within the institutions (Harkavy et al 2009), otherwise a change in leadership 
could lead to a jettisoning of an entire TCM-type program.  Such 
institutionalisation might include consistent and recurring long-term funding of 
network requirements, as well as linking cooperative networks to educational, 
health, training, research, teaching, and learning missions (Dubb & Howard 
2012). 
 
In summary, for a successful implementation of TCM, both Dubb & Howard 
(2012, p. 23) and Harkavy et al (2009, p. 160), reason that project coordinators 
would need to: 
‘ (1) (have) clear objectives in terms of local investment, local purchasing, hiring 
in low-income communities, business incubation, green job development, and 
wealth creation; (2) (have) clear delineation of how economic development 
objectives will connect with core institutional programs – e.g., education for 
universities and health care for hospitals; (3) (have) indication of institutional 
support at the CEO/presidential level and of a commitment of internal funds and 
in-kind support; (4) (have) evidence of state and local government support; (5) 
(have) inclusion of community development corporation and other local 
community groups in the development of goals and objectives; and (6) (use) clear 
metrics to track the impact anchor institution investments in community building 
have over time’.  
 
This thesis would argue, however, that to coordinate the before mentioned 
appears to be no small task, and would require considerable determination, 
desire, and goodwill by all parties.  It could also be argued that it would require 
more conscious cooperation than might a single-minded drive for profit.  And 
whilst this report maintains that cooperative models have proven themselves 
competitive, profitable, efficient, innovative, and sustainable, the broader 
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criticisms of distributist-cooperativist models pertaining to their organisational 
and network complexities are long-standing; and as such, need addressing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Page 75 of 112 
 
9. Critiques and counter-critiques of Distributive and 
Cooperative political-economies  
The first set of critiques to be discussed are structural in nature, and derive 
from liberal viewpoints.  A salient point is that liberals have critiqued 
cooperative economies since the mid Nineteenth Century (Devas 1892), and 
this paper would argue that many historical critiques are still pertinent.   
For instance, Devas (1892) argued that an affectedly remunerated 
entrepreneurial class was essential for societal wealth creation, and that 
egalitarian cooperative processes were incapable of generating both the 
innovations and wealth that a buccaneering elite could.  However, this paper 
would argue that the cutting-edge efficiencies, research and development 
prowess, and commercially desirable products of both MCC and Evergreen 
Cooperatives (Alperovitz 2013; Forcadell 2005) substantially contradict Devas’ 
(1892) claims. 
However, a more nuanced criticism by Devas (1892) is that authoritarian 
capitalist organisations, counterintuitively, better allow for the employment of 
workers with diverse and clashing worldviews.  Devas (1892) contended that 
diverse views barely impact the top-down, technocratic, authoritarian methods 
of capitalist organisations.  And whilst technocratic, profit driven forces may be 
used to unify workers, such demands appeared slight when compared to the 
‘great uniformity in views and habits’ (p. 473), and the purposeful training and 
education required to unify cooperative organisations.  Devas (1892) similarly 
reasoned that cooperatives also required an elevated level of good will and pro-
social behaviour, in contrast to capitalist organisations who could simply 
impose codes of conduct and be content with superficial compliance.  This 
paper will contend that Devas’ (1892) arguments on these points are mostly 
specious. 
Firstly, Devas (1892) profoundly underestimated the impacts upon persons of 
having to conform to technocratic, profit driven systems.  One example of the 
processes used to enforce neoliberal workplace compliance, according to 
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Derber & Magrass (2016), is work-place bullying, which is often disturbing and 
deep in its personal and societal effects.  Derber & Magrass (2016) argue that 
schoolyard bullying is mostly an outgrowth of the pervasive bullying found 
within neoliberal workplaces, and that bullying is endemic to such 
organisations regardless of the respective management psychology.  Their 
argument continues that neoliberal-capitalism requires workplace bullying to 
“help” workers accept the “naturalness” of the radically asymmetrical 
neoliberal social order.  And, moreover, acceptance of, and resistance to, socio-
economic bullying often manifests within workers feelings of inferiority and 
anger respectively, and that such feelings represent deep wounds of social class 
battles (Derber & Magrass 2016).  These are hardly superficial psychological 
impacts, and most probably contradict Devas’ (1892) historical assertions. 
Secondly, Devas (1892) underestimated the diversity of persons and opinions 
that can be found within successfully functioning cooperatives.  For instance, 
The Evergreen Cooperatives have successfully incorporated persons who at 
“face-value” appear to have little in common, such as refugees, ex-prisoners, 
and university educated professionals (Evergreen Cooperatives 2011, 2017; 
Trattner 2017).  Moreover, the education and training processes at either MCC 
or Evergreen Cooperatives do not appear invasive and indoctrinating 
(Evergreen Cooperatives 2011; Ridley-Duff 2010); in fact, the highly innovative 
and radically democratic Irizar MCC sub-co-op has shown that such training can 
prove dynamically empowering and transforming for working persons 
(Forcadell 2005). 
Nevertheless, Devas (1892) further argued that the free-market best 
represented persons as they really were, which is prone to selfishness and not 
naturally cooperative.  However, Devas (1892), contradicts himself profoundly 
on this point.  Devas (1892) (like Locke before him [Wolin 2004]) also argued 
that the selfish subjectivism inherent within liberal-capitalism meant that it 
would have soon turned anarchic had it not been for its Christian, pro-social 
and cooperative social inheritance.  Thus, capitalism is arguably more 
dependent upon idealistic, pro-social behaviours than its cooperative counter-
parts, if only to prevent its anarchic potentialities (Belloc 1946; Bowman & 
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Stone 2004).  This argument perhaps renders liberal theorists’ claims of being 
able to accommodate and harness human selfishness (such as M & R Friedman 
1990) as duplicitous, since these claims are wholly dependent upon most 
people (and especially workers) at most times not acting selfishly (Belloc 1946; 
Bowman & Stone 2004). 
Other neoliberal structural critiques of cooperativism include those of Epstein 
et al (2007), who argued that since the onset of the Industrial Revolution most 
persons in developed nations have consistently and voluntarily chosen to work 
for capitalist or technocratic organisations, and have not risked working for 
themselves, or risked establishing with others cooperative enterprises.  For 
Epstein et al (2007), this fact alone means that cooperative economies cannot 
be something ordinary persons want.  In addition, Epstein et al (2007) have 
argued that distributist desires for both socio-economic stability and personal 
empowerment are nonsensical, since life is inherently insecure and unstable.  
However (the argument continues), capitalism has been able to harness such 
anxieties by creating products and services to address them, and this in turn 
has created overall higher living standards.  Epstein et al (2007) have also 
argued that the consumer in a capitalist society is already empowered; in fact, 
the consumer “is king”.  And a sign of that empowerment is the consumer’s 
ability to take advantage of technocratic capitalism’s economies of scale and 
efficient productions of multitudinous goods and services.  
This paper counter-argues that Epstein et al’s (2007) arguments are thin.  As 
both Robbins (2011) and Belloc (1946) have argued, the transition in Europe 
from a distributive-cooperative Medieval economy to a liberal-industrial 
economy was determined, and violently coercive.  And rather than simply 
“volunteering” to work in often nightmarish factory conditions, the liberal 
project left working persons so vulnerable, that employment by capitalists 
often appeared as the only option (accept for destitution).  Similarly, before the 
liberal Industrial Revolutions, capitalist work arrangements for most working 
persons seemed either unimaginable or threatening (Belloc 1946; Robbins 
2011).  Regarding Epstein et al’s (2007) argument that social instability is a 
primary generator of innovation and wealth, both the MCC and Evergreen 
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Cooperatives have demonstrated that stable work environments and 
communities can innovate as well as any unstable capitalist system (Alperovitz 
2013; Forcadell 2005).  Moreover, Epstein et al’s (2007) argument does not 
consider the deep distress that economic instability renders for working 
persons (Case & Deaton 2015; Derber & Magrass 2016; Glover 2015) and that 
such arguments are generally made by academic and financial elites secure in 
their social and financial positions (Goodhart 2017; Mead 2017).  What is more, 
the “consumer is king” hypothesis arguably renders persons as passive selfish 
beings, without desire for deeper social and political engagement (Hamilton 
2003).  And like their liberal antecedent, Locke, (A Dictionary of Philosophy 
1996; Wolin 2004) Epstein et al (2007) provide no evidence to validate their 
claims that consumers in their daily acts of consuming feel majestic, in control, 
and at the apex of their personal and societal powers.  However, there is much 
evidence to the contrary (Hamilton 2003) (also see Critique of Global 
Neoliberalism above). 
The next set of cooperative critiques deal with failings specific to Australia, as 
well as detailing aspects of the Australian cooperative political-economy 
terrain. 
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10. Australian cooperative political-economy 
terrain 
It is important to firstly note that cooperativist penetration of the Australian 
political-economy is already considerable, with eight out of every 10 
Australians being members of co-operatively or mutually owned enterprises 
(mutuals).  Mutuals in this paper will mean organisations that are cooperatively 
centred around the benefit of their fee-paying members, and where profits are 
directed towards member services as well as organisational growth and 
betterment (BCCM 2017).  Nevertheless, ‘only three in ten Australians could 
name a co-operative or mutually owned enterprise and only 16 per cent of 
Australians believe that they are a member of one’ (Denniss & Baker 2012, p. 
1).  And despite the ‘widespread membership of co-ops, and the size and 
economic significance of the sector, community awareness of the sector runs 
far behind community reliance on the sector’ (Denniss & Baker 2012, p. 1).  
Nevertheless, according to Denniss & Baker (2012), such widespread 
membership would suggest that co-ops and mutuals offer services and goods 
superior to their for-profit equivalents.  Examples of common Australian 
cooperative organisations include credit unions, farmer owned agri-businesses, 
community banks, and trade suppliers, whilst mutuals include RSL Clubs, 
leagues clubs, health insurers, and car service suppliers (BCCM 2017).  Another 
sign that Australians may be predisposed towards cooperative alternatives is a 
widespread suspicion of liberal corporatism.  For instance, ‘Australians believe 
that privately owned for-profit companies are more interested in shareholder 
profit than customers (90 per cent), that large shareholders have too much 
influence (88 per cent) and that corporate executives are overpaid (92 per 
cent) (Denniss & Baker 2012, p. 2).  Nevertheless, the strongly contradictory 
combinations of: widespread membership and use of cooperative 
organisations; widespread ignorance of cooperative organisations (and even 
ignorance of being a member of one); and widespread community suspicion of 
corporations to which Australian cooperative organisations appear little 
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interested in taking advantage of, all together represent a set of peculiar failings 
of the Australian cooperative movement (Denniss & Baker 2012). 
It would appear that the core of this peculiar failing, is that whilst for-profit 
organisations vigorously and ingeniously promote both their “brand” and their 
community contributions, cooperative and mutual organisations mostly try to 
maximise returns to their members, as well as donations to the community, 
partly through not spending on advertising.  The effect of this is that 
corporations are comparatively well known for their brands and relatively 
modest community contributions, whilst cooperative organisations are 
comparatively unknown for both their brands and relatively generous 
community contributions.  Community members are also less likely to know 
about the lower running costs of cooperatives, and that cooperative 
organisations consistently rate higher in terms of customer satisfaction.  In fact, 
it has been argued that the effectiveness of cooperative organisations has been 
demonstrated by their success in attracting and keeping members despite their 
lack of advertising, (Denniss & Baker 2012).  Denniss & Baker (2012) suggest 
that a way to help remedy this information gap is for co-ops and mutuals to 
start explaining their organisational structures and benefits to their members.  
They further suggest that a central registry of community organisations be 
created to help coordinate and fund individual and broader cooperative 
campaigns, as well as garner political support.  However, cooperation amongst 
Australian cooperative organisations has, ironically, been historically 
problematic (Balnave & Patmore 2012; Mathews 2008 [A]). 
Throughout the 20th Century, a consistent failure by the disparate Australian 
cooperative movements has been an inability to unite around common goals 
(Balnave & Patmore 2012, Mathews 2003, 2007, 2008 [A]).  The divides 
between cooperatives have been many; however, an important divide appears 
to have occurred between the powerful agricultural-producer cooperatives and 
the smaller, mostly consumer co-ops.  An apparent cause of this was that large 
agricultural cooperatives tended to view their natural “allies” (at least in terms 
of legislative and infrastructure requirements) as being large, for-profit 
producers, rather than fellow cooperative and mutual organisations.  A 
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manifestation of this was when large agricultural co-ops, much like their for-
profit rivals, refused to accommodate the wholesale purchase requirements of 
consumer cooperatives.  And there appeared little interest by the agricultural 
co-ops to resolve such matters for the sake of the broader cooperative project.  
In fact, pre-WWII attempts to form a cooperative “peak-body” with a mandate 
to promote, defend, and assist cooperatives were principally scuttled by the 
large rural producer co-ops.  Their main contention was the adoption of the 
strongly democratic Rochdale cooperative principles, which were supported by 
most smaller cooperative organisations.  The large rural producer co-ops even 
opposed government legislation that defined cooperative organisations along 
Rochdale lines (Balnave & Patmore 2012).  
There were also damaging divides external to the cooperative movement 
throughout the 20th Century.  Arguably the most damaging were the 
antagonisms between the cooperative movement and both the union 
movement and the Labor party (Balnave & Patmore 2012; Mathews 2007).  
Despite multiple consumer cooperatives extending credit to striking workers, 
as well as co-ops honouring union closed shop agreements, Australian trade-
union leaders suspiciously viewed cooperatives as part of the capitalist project.  
They also viewed cooperative worker-owners as little different to capitalist-
employees.  Moreover, during the inter-war period, cooperative movement 
calls for unions of co-op employees angered both trade-unionists and members 
of the Labor party.  The cooperative movement also refused to choose party 
sides during elections, as well as during the bitter Democratic Labour Party- 
Australian Labor Party split of the 1950’s.  This political neutrality seemed to 
entrench suspicion of the movement within both Labor and Liberal parties 
(Balnave & Patmore 2012). 
Nevertheless, the cooperative movement did have support from the Country 
Party (now National Party) (Balnave & Patmore 2012; Mathews 2003, 2007), 
and the Country Party was instrumental in the watershed NSW Co-operation 
Act of 1924, which set rules to assist the formation of cooperatives.  
Nevertheless, the Country Party’s support of cooperatives was questionable, 
since their primary loyalty appeared to be towards the large farmer producer 
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co-ops.  In fact, The Country Party regularly sided with both large agri-business 
co-ops and agribusinesses against the interests of the broader cooperative 
movements (for example, by supporting cooperative movements which did not 
wish to adopt the Rochdale principles).  In response, smaller cooperative 
movement members accused the large rural producer co-ops of remaking 
themselves around the needs of a pro-big-business Country Party (Balnave & 
Patmore 2012). 
Apart from these external and internal divides, Australian cooperative and 
mutual organisations suffered from coordinated supplier boycotts initiated by 
rival for-profit businesses (especially supermarkets) (Balnave & Patmore 
2012). In such cases, large for-profit businesses refused to do business with 
wholesalers who supplied co-ops, which then lead to the wholesalers ceasing 
their business with the co-ops.  Consumer co-ops also felt a virtual boycott 
regarding finance credit, and with the advent of supermarkets and shopping 
malls, very few consumer co-ops could access credit to fund building and 
infrastructure upgrades to compete.  Moreover, globalisation hollowed out 
traditional, stable, and locality based working-class communities (especially 
mining and rural) and so too loyalties to local co-ops (Balnave & Patmore 
2012).  Other issues included technocratic colonisation of cooperatives and 
mutuals (Mathews 2007), financial mismanagement, and poor strategic 
planning (Balnave & Patmore 2012); although these are hardly unique to 
cooperatives.  Nevertheless, such trends meant that by the 1970’s co-ops and 
mutual organisations began turning to standard business models and even 
outside corporatist managers.  However, this common “knee-jerk” strategy 
rarely (if ever) worked (Balnave & Patmore 2012; Mathews 2007).  In fact, 
multiple theorists have argued that the further cooperatives stray from their 
initial missions, the greater the chance they will experience demutualisation, 
deregistration, business failure, corporate predation, member squabbling, and 
loss of membership (Balnave & Patmore 2012; Oczkowski, Krivokapic-Skoko & 
Plummer 2013; Matthews 2007; van Oorschot, de Hoog, van der Steen & van 
Twist 2013). 
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Concluding statements regarding the Australian cooperative political-
economy terrain 
The cooperative business model appears to be able to match and even out 
compete its for-profit equivalents.  Moreover, Denniss & Baker (2012) argue 
that once citizens are familiar with cooperatives in one sphere, they are far 
more likely to join or engage with cooperative processes elsewhere.  However, 
what appears to prevent this most is an inability by cooperatives to form 
mutually agreed upon regional support networks of trade, promotion, and 
finance (Balnave & Patmore 2012; Mathews 2003, 2007).  This paper would 
argue that in the Australian context this fact cannot be blamed solely on the 
recalcitrance of the large agricultural cooperatives (Balnave & Patmore 2012), 
since both MCC in Spain and Evergreen Cooperatives in Cleveland were able to 
develop strong regional networks without large cooperatives on-board 
(Alperovitz 2013; Mathews 2008 [A]).  Nevertheless, both those models did 
seem to require at least initial backing by authoritative bodies – in MCC’s case it 
was the Catholic Church (Geoghegan 2017), whilst Evergreen Cooperatives 
used a coordinated array of anchor institutions, cooperative think-tanks, and 
powerful philanthropies (Wright et al 2017).  It should also be noted that both 
TCM and MCC required central promotional and coordinating bodies to initiate 
cooperative processes and coordinate the necessary production, trade, finance, 
and logistical requirements (Alperovitz 2013, Mathews 2003).  Such bodies 
need not be national; however, it appears that they would need to be at least 
regional.  A salient point is that Australia does have a national representative 
body of cooperatives (Business Council of Co-operatives and Mutuals [BCCM]) as 
well as New South Wales equivalent (Co-ops NSW). However, it appears that the 
activities of both organisations are mostly centred upon lobbying government 
on behalf of their members, and providing both legal advice and information to 
both members and to those wishing to start a co-op or mutual organisation 
(BCCM 2017; Co-ops NSW).  However, broad cooperative movements appear to 
require considerable and determined coordination and support from 
overarching cooperative bodies and institutional backers, and without these, 
the evidence suggests there is little possibility for such well-integrated 
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networks to emerge organically and spontaneously (Alperovitz 2013; Mathews 
2007). 
 In response to this, this paper conducted an analysis to determine whether 
there existed in NSW an institutional terrain which could theoretically initiate a 
coordinated and cooperative business network like MCC or TCM.  And it 
determined the Catholic Archdiocese of Sydney to be a viable candidate.  
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11. Why Choose the NSW Catholic Organisational 
terrain for Analysis? 
Catholic institutions and networks were chosen for analysis for four main 
reasons.  Firstly, both distributism and cooperative concepts are firmly part of 
the Catholic philosophical, social justice, and organisational traditions (Belloc 
1946; Mathews 2007).  Thus, there was synergy between the Catholic 
organisational/network terrain and the research epistemology.  Secondly, there 
appeared an already strong distributist-like network of Catholic anchor 
institutions and organisations, with a potential for enacting distributist-type 
economic models (or at least research into the matter).  Thirdly, the Catholic 
organisational and network terrain was easily bounded for the purposes of 
research.  Similarly, and lastly, the report concluded that their appeared to be 
no obvious constellation of secular organisations and networks from which to 
conduct preliminary analyses, or at least not ones with obvious connections to 
the research’s distributist epistemology.  Therefore, it will be argued that this 
combination of theoretical and organisational synergies, means that the 
Catholic organisational terrain is a potentially productive place to start an 
exploration of the possibilities in NSW for a TCM or MCC equivalent.  However, 
this focus is not to negate research possibilities regarding secular cooperative 
networks, especially since secular groups like The Democracy Collaborative 
and The Cleveland Foundation were successful in adapting distributist 
principles to secular contexts (Alperovitz 2013; Wright et al 2017).  In fact, this 
report argues that research into Catholic organisations and cooperative 
economies might hopefully open research into secular equivalents, by 
providing possible pathways and insights.  
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12. Terrain Review Analysis Schematic 
 
Research Theoretical Approach: Distributistism 
See introduction 
Methodological Approach: Qualitative 
According to Abercrombie et al (2006, p. 314), qualitative research involves the 
interpretation of social phenomena in ways not dependent upon mathematical 
or statistical quantifications.  For this report, the baseline qualitative 
interpretation technique upon which concepts, dimensions, indicators, 
hypotheses, and methods (Alston & Bowles 2012) were based, was the 
Australian Catholic Social Justice Council’s (2017) three-step process for 
“reading the signs of the times”.  The first step was seeing, which meant 
intentionally examining primary data and naming both what you saw and what 
concerned you; the second step was judging, which meant theoretically 
analysing and reflecting upon the flagged data before making an informed 
assessment; and the last step was acting, which meant acting only after 
establishing what to do, how do it, and with a view to enabling dignified, pro-
social transformations aimed towards the common good. 
     
Methods 
The research method used was a literature review of the relevant Catholic 
organisations’ mission statements, executive summaries, “about us” statements, 
and social justice statements.  The relevant organisations included anchor 
institutions, official business networks, social justice organisations, and 
overarching bodies that coordinated health-care and education respectively.  
With regards to social justice organisations, these were only included if there 
was a commercial or jobs training aspect to their mission.  
Analysis concepts and their elements 
According to Alston & Bowles (2012), concepts contain clusters of related 
elements, and this is significant since the literature review sought to identify 
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clusters of elements corresponding respectively with the five distributist first-
order principles.  Below are the analysis concepts used regarding the 
organisational analyses along with their respective elements:  
Regarding the organisation’s assessment of the Person, the researcher looked for: 
a professed concern for human dignity; a belief that human dignity is best 
manifested through pro-social, cooperative inter-personal and communal 
relations; an active opposition to situations that violate personal integrity or 
dignity (Belloc 1946; Cornish 2017); an emphasis on self-worth; an emphasis 
upon strong familial, social, and employment networks (Belloc 1946; 
Chesterton 1927); promotion of civic engagement (Warhurst 1996); a belief 
that ‘everyone has the right to access the goods of creation to meet their needs’ 
(or Panis Humanis) (Belloc 1931; Cornish 2017, p. 2); and a professed belief in 
solidarity ‘which means that we are all … responsible for each other.  It is not… 
a vague sort of compassion… but … a determination to commit oneself to 
working for change so that everyone will be able to reach their potential’ 
(Cornish 2017, p. 2). 
Regarding the organisation’s assessment of the Common Good, the researcher 
looked for: an understanding that ‘the collection of social conditions’ should 
‘make it possible for each social group and all their individual members to 
achieve their potential’; and a belief that ‘the rights and duties of individuals 
and groups must be harmonised under the’ common good (Cornish 2017). 
Regarding the organisation’s assessment of the Good Life, the researcher looked 
for: a belief in the rights of familial domesticity; an emphasis upon the 
importance of dispersed capital ownership and self-sufficiency; and a belief in 
the importance of meaningful participation both within the workplace and the 
community (Belloc 1946; Chesterton 1927; Cornish 2017;). 
Regarding the organisation’s assessment of Subsidiarity, the researcher looked 
for: a belief that the ‘people or groups most directly affected by a decision or 
policy should have a key decision-making role’ (Cornish 2017, p. 2). 
Regarding the organisation’s assessment of Authority, the researcher looked for: 
a belief that the requirements of personal dignity, familial requirements, 
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community needs, environmental necessities, and democratic processes have 
authority over narrow market or bureaucratic/technocratic requirements, but 
with an understanding that every business still needs a market for its products, 
and that organisational methods remain powerful and indispensable means to 
deliver prosperity (Belloc 1946). 
The indicators used for identifying research concepts were rhetorically based 
rather than key-word based, since the chosen organisations did not necessarily 
use the same terminology as this thesis.  However, organisational claims and 
intentions could still align with the above research concepts.  The combination 
of organisational rhetoric, infrastructure and financial assets, and personnel 
abilities were then subjected to the tests of plausibility, authenticity, and 
insightfulness (Guba & Lincoln 1994).  For instance, it was asked whether it 
was plausible that the targeted organisation would wish to participate in future 
research; and whether its organisational rhetoric appeared authentic when 
compared to its output; and finally, did the organisation have noteworthy 
insight regarding distributist related concepts.  All three methods of judgement 
were used in the final determination of whether an organisation should be 
approached for future research participation.  Nevertheless, the literature 
review did not seek to definitively prove a relationship between the chosen 
organisations and the research project’s distributist concepts.  Rather, that one 
could not rule out a relationship (Alston & Bowles 2012).  This link, and the 
steps behind it, could then be shown to prospective participants and hopefully 
create for them interest in the research.  
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13. Catholic Organisational Terrain Review 
Summary 
The review was divided into two overarching sections: Catholic anchor 
institutions and organisations; and Catholic organisational networks.  These 
networks, organisations, and institutions varied respectively regarding their 
connections to distributist concepts.  Nevertheless, there were examples of 
organisations with strong conceptual links to the research, and most notably 
Australian Catholic University (ACU) (2017).  This example is significant 
because cooperatively minded anchor institutions were pivotal to the success 
of TCM (Wright et al 2017). 
The terrain review also noted sophisticated, well developed, distributist like 
organisational networks.  These cooperative networks often extended to 
outside organisations such as secular universities, government departments, 
and other faith based groups.  Cooperative banking as well as organisational 
and human resource development bodies were also part of the Catholic 
organisational terrain, which is significant because such bodies were pivotal to 
the success of both TCM and MCC (Alperovitz 2013; Mathews 2003, 2008 [A]).  
In fact, the basic building blocks of a MCC or TCM seemed present, including the 
presence of an overarching coordinating body, the Catholic Archdiocese of 
Sydney.  However, what was not clear was whether the Archdiocese could 
perform or delegate such a role within a local TCM or MCC adaptation.  This 
would be a key area of future research, since central coordinating bodies 
appear central to the success of cooperative networks.   And whilst links to, and 
explications of, distributist and cooperativist theories were mostly nascent in 
the literature (excepting ACU), there seemed enough demonstrable 
commonalities for a researcher to engage organisational representatives in 
future research.  In summary, the Catholic organisational and network terrain 
appeared to hold considerable possibilities for research into MCC and TCM 
adaptations. 
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Institutions and Networks Reviewed 
 The Catholic anchor institutions reviewed were Notre Dame University, 
Australian Catholic University, and St Vincent’s Hospital, and the organisational 
networks reviewed were Sydney Catholic Business Network, The Catholic 
Archdiocese of Sydney’s Aged Care & Health Care Networks, Catholic Schools 
NSW, and Catholic Cemeteries and Crematoria.  Additional organisations 
reviewed were the Catholic Commission for Employment Relations, Reach 
Human Resources, Catholic Development Fund, Australian Catholic 
Superannuation, and Catholic Archdiocese of Sydney Conference Centre.  A salient 
point is that all the before mentioned fall under the auspices of the Catholic 
Archdiocese of Sydney; however, it appears that the individual bodies possess 
considerable autonomy under the Archdiocese’s authority. 
Regarding the anchor institutions, Australian Catholic University (ACU 2017; 
Agencies Guide 2017) seemed to relate most strongly to the five distributist 
first-order principles (and especially subsidiarity and authority).  Moreover, it 
had well developed cooperative links across civil society, government, and 
business spectrums (ACU 2017; IACE 2012).  Because of these strong research 
relevancies, ACU presented as the foremost candidate for future research.  
Regarding The University Notre Dame Australia (Notre Dame), its strongest 
commonalities regarding the research were its desires to develop and manifest 
Catholic philosophical teachings.   Notre Dame also had strong links to the 
business community (through its business studies programmes) as well as to St 
Vincent’s Hospital (through its School of Medicine and Nursing) (Agencies Guide 
2017; The University of Notre Dame Australia, 2016, 2017 [A, B]).  These points 
are relevant since it was the leveraging of work contracts off hospitals which 
played a pivotal role in the development and success of TCM, and business 
development is core to the success of cooperatives (Howard 2012).  
Nonetheless, Notre Dame’s links to distributist precepts were neither much 
developed or obvious (in contrast to ACU), but its Catholic philosophical 
tradition, business development studies, and extensive business and medical 
networks respectively (The University of Notre Dame Australia, 2016, 2017 [A, 
B]), ranked it as a potential research partner.  In contrast, the focus of St 
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Vincent’s Hospital appeared mostly inwards towards its patients, and especially 
towards patients who were societally marginalised.  And whilst St Vincent’s 
Hospital did rate strongly across values regarding the person, subsidiarity, and 
authority, its desires for broad community development or connection 
appeared limited (Agencies Guide 2017; St Vincent’s Hospital Sydney 2017).  As 
such, it was determined that any contact with St Vincent’s Hospital would be 
done after connections had been made with more likeminded organisations and 
networks, since St Vincent’s Hospital seemed an unlikely early, proactive 
research participant. 
Regarding the Catholic network structures, these appeared noteworthy for 
their stable, developed, cooperative, and sophisticated nature, as well as for 
their sense of mission.  They were, arguably, examples that refute the 
arguments made by neoliberal theorists such as M & R Friedman (1990) that 
competitive, contractual, and profit driven resource allocation networks are 
necessarily the best means to organise political-economy models.  Of special 
note were the vast aged care, healthcare, cemetery, and school networks, which 
could be viewed respectively as aggregated anchor institutions from which 
work contracts could be leveraged.  And whilst there appeared to be little 
reference to Distributist concepts within their respective literatures, the actual 
manifestations of distributist organisational and network principles presented 
as research significant (Agencies Guide 2017; Catholic Archdiocese of Sydney 
2017).  An additional network was the Sydney Catholic Business Network 
(2017) (Agencies Guide 2017), which appeared to have strong principles 
regarding the common good and member solidarity (part of the distributist 
good life).  Its extensive networks linking Catholic organisations and member 
businesses, together with the network’s desires to manifest charitable activities 
and to contribute towards the common good, arguably have potential to help 
foster, develop, and trade with cooperative start-ups.  Thus, whilst not having 
strong, obvious theoretical links to the research, the before mentioned 
networks do possess strong cooperative manifestations from which future 
research could gather data. 
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Further organisations reviewed included the Catholic Commission for 
Employment Relations (2017) and Reach Human Resources (2017) (Agencies 
Guide 2017).  Apart from references to the importance of workplace dignity and 
justice, there were no obvious links to distributist theory in their reviewed 
literature.  Nevertheless, human relations and administrative organisations 
were pivotal to the success of both MCC and TCM (Alperovitz 2013; Mathews 
2008 [A]), and, thus, their strong presence within the Catholic organisational 
terrain bodes well for research.  So too the inclusion of the Catholic 
Development Fund (CDF) (2017) (Agencies Guide 2017), which acts as an 
internal network banking and finance mechanism.  Such mechanisms were 
integral to the success of TCM and especially for MCC (Alperovitz 2013; 
Mathews 2003, 2008 [A]).  Moreover, CDF mimics considerably the cooperative 
finance mechanisms of MCC.  The literature review, nevertheless, revealed 
neither evidence of financing or facilitating of cooperative start-ups.  This is 
despite the potentials for this, and the fact that cooperatives are part of the 
Catholic organisational tradition (Belloc 1946).  The same appeared true 
regarding the Australian Catholic Superannuation (2017) (Agencies Guide 
2017) literature.  Whilst acknowledging this absence, the said organisations’ 
modes of operations strongly aligned with distributist principles, and for this 
reason it is plausible that organisational representatives may wish to take part 
in future research. 
Catholic organisational terrain review conclusion  
The combination of Catholic anchor institutions, organisations, and networks 
that both reference and effectively manifest distributist related concepts, bodes 
well for their involvement in future research.  In fact, it could be argued that 
most of the organisational and networking infrastructure required for an MCC 
or TCM network is already present, and merely requires “activation”.  Such 
optimism, however, might be the result of having only conducted the first 
stages of research, and subsequent research may render such views mistaken.  
Nonetheless, the Catholic organisational and networking terrain appears 
favourable for the conduct of research into the possibilities of enacting TCM 
and MCC within a NSW context. 
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By way of contrast, the research also reviewed the two-main overarching 
secular cooperative bodies in NSW, Business Council of Co-operatives and 
Mutuals and Co-ops NSW. 
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14. Literature review of overarching cooperative 
bodies – Business Council of Co-operatives and 
Mutuals and Co-ops NSW 
 
The Business Council of Co-operatives and Mutuals (BCCM) appears to be the 
pre-eminent national body for Australian co-operatives and mutual enterprises, 
and its role appears to be mostly a networking platform for large commercial 
co-ops, as well an advocate for their members vis-à-vis the government.  
Considering that BCCM’s members include some of the largest private 
businesses in Australia (for instance, CBH Group, HCF, Devondale Murray 
Goulburn, and Queensland Sugar) (BCCM 2017), BCCM’s activities appear 
modest.  For example, its last newsletter was published in September 2016 
(more than a year from the time of writing), and its media releases appear to 
focus mostly on the successes and interests of its largest members.  In contrast, 
concepts such as the broad coordination and integration of the co-operative 
movement, or the broad-scale facilitation of co-operative start-ups, did not 
appear as prominent issues.  Thus, from its website literature alone, BCCM’s 
capacity to play a deeper coordination role, such as played by MCC, appeared as 
not significant (BCCM 2017). 
Similarly, Co-ops NSW did not appear to be seeking a coordinating role within 
an integrated, cooperative political-economy project.  And like BCCM, it 
appeared somewhat inactive; for instance, its last AGM report was from 2015 
(two years from the time of writing).  Nevertheless, Co-ops NSW’s cooperative 
philosophy appeared more insightful, proactive, and developed than BCCM’s 
(Co-ops NSW 2017).  It also listed cooperation amongst cooperatives as one of 
its guiding principles (Co-ops NSW).  However, the point did not appear to be 
much emphasized, or at least not in terms of advocating for determined, 
coordinating cooperative bodies.  Thus, this report would argue that it did not 
appear plausible that either body would lead research into a MCC or TCM, or 
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not in comparison to the already cooperatively integrated Sydney Catholic 
network terrain.  
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15. Report Conclusions 
The first set of conclusions pertain to research directions stemming from the 
report.  These include researching localities with conditions like those in which 
successful, integrated and coordinated cooperative projects have emerged.  
This paper would argue that such conditions include locality failure to attract 
or keep investment capital, whilst still being able to retain anchor institutions 
and organisations (Alperovitz 2013).  The relevant institutions would also need 
to be willing to engage proactively in their locality’s economy, as well as be 
open to cooperative concepts, and perhaps even take on coordination and 
facilitation roles (Dubb & Howard 2012; Wright et al 2017).  These are, 
perhaps, uncommon sets of conditions within NSW, and there may instead exist 
differing sets of conditions applicable for the activation of integrated 
cooperative economic models within the state.  Future related research may 
also return the verdict that political-economy terrains such as NSW are 
generally unfavourable for such projects.  This result would still be valuable 
data, especially since organisations like Co-ops NSW (2017) have emphasised 
that there is a lack of academic research into co-ops generally, and that greater 
insight is needed. 
This report would offer, however, that a more immediately productive vein of 
research would be an investigation into the cooperative possibilities within the 
Catholic Archdiocese of Sydney’s network terrain.  The Archdiocese’s terrain 
appeared coherent and coordinated, and its member’s philosophies and 
organisational methods seemed to align with the methods and underlying 
philosophies of MCC and TCM.  Of further significance, was the presence within 
the network of anchor institutions from which TCM like cooperatives could 
possibly leverage off long-term work contracts (Agencies Guide 2017; Catholic 
Archdiocese of Sydney 2017).  As such, the coordinated organisational terrain of 
the Catholic Archdiocese of Sydney seemed to possess possibilities for an 
activation of a NSW variant of MCC or TCM.  By comparison, the NSW secular 
cooperative and institutional terrain appeared disparate, and its central bodies 
seemed to be mostly advocates and information providers, rather than 
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coordinators and integrators of cooperatives (BCCM 2017; Co-ops NSW 2017).  
Moreover, this research project found multiple commonalities between the 
reviewed Catholic organisations’ philosophies and goals, and this paper’s 
guiding precepts and goals.  These commonalities could help provide grounded, 
demonstrable reasons for approaching targeted Catholic organisations for 
future research, as well as help shape research questions and research 
directions.   
The second set of conclusions address this paper’s modest contributions 
towards the academic field of political-economy.  Regarding these, this 
paper argues that the first-order assumptions of liberalism, and by extension 
neoliberalism, have never been person, family, and community centric 
(Chesterton 1927); rather, they have centred on aggregations of consumer 
activities and control over resource allocation systems (Wolin 2004). The 
argument continues that these assumptions manifest themselves in propulsive 
political-economies that prioritize social power relations (Robbins 2011), 
contractual relationships (Bowman & stone 2004; Mathews 2003), technocratic 
mastery, select control over resources (Wolin 2004), and prioritizing economic 
growth above anthropocentric concerns (Hamilton 2003).  This critique of 
liberalism is not new (Belloc 1946; Edwards 2002; Hamilton 2003).  However, 
this paper further argues that the apparent decoupling of the liberal political-
economy from broad anthropocentric requirements (for example, personal 
dignity, the ability to say no to market coercions, familial domesticity, local 
culture, and self-sufficiency) (Belloc 1946), in preference for systems’ 
requirements and individuated subjectivities, creates sustainability issues not 
only socio-politically, but also environmentally and economically (Klein 2014).   
In response to these issues, the report reviewed distributist theory and its most 
prominent manifestation, the vast integrated and cutting-edge cooperatives or 
MCC (Mathews 2007).  The review emphasised the differences between what it 
saw as the first order assumptions of liberalism and distributism, and how each 
manifest different political-economies.  The paper then contended that 
distributism’s first order priorities of the person, the common good, the good 
life, subsidiarity, and the personal, familial, and local sources of authority, 
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favour political-economies in which capital ownership and control is 
widespread and locality focused, as well as being mostly cooperative rather 
than mostly competitive.  Moreover, distributists have historically argued that 
their economic models are no less “free market” than the liberal-capitalist 
equivalents (Belloc 1946), and that the innovative and efficient dynamism of 
MCC perhaps proves this point (Forcadell 2005).  The report also looked at a 
successful derivative of MCC, the anchor institution based model of TCM, and 
how both models have been able to organise economic arrangements in 
comprehensible, worker empowering, technologically innovative, cooperative 
and community wealth producing ways (Alperovitz 2013; Mathews 2003).  
Nevertheless, the report also identified that both arrangements do not appear 
to emerge spontaneously or organically, and appear to require determined 
coordination by authoritative organisations and change agents (Geoghegan 
2017; Dubb & Howard 2012).  Additionally, such cooperative economies have 
not been immune from technocratic infiltration (Kasmir 1999), and similarly, 
without both determined mutual support and coordination mechanisms 
cooperatives have been shown to be vulnerable to neoliberal business 
predation (Balnave & Patmore 2012; Mathews 2003, 2007, 2008 [A]). 
Nevertheless, this report concludes that constructing distributist political-
economic alternatives, whist seemingly complex (Dubb & Howard 2012), is 
possible, and that these appear to better provide for anthropocentric 
requirements such as capital ownership and control (Howard 2012), dignified 
and cooperative work relationships, work security (Davidson 2012; Howard 
2012) and localised economies (Alperovitz 2013).  And that such political-
economies seem to offer qualitative and sustainability advantages over their 
liberalist-capitalist rivals (Alperovitz 2013; Bowman & Stone 2004).  As such, 
this paper argues that both cooperative economies and distributist derived 
theories deserve more research, especially since there appears to be an 
academic lacuna regarding such areas (Co-ops NSW 2017).    
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